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SUMMARY
This book employs various theories of contemporary security studies to 
explore some of the most important and most common security issues 
in Central Europe at this time. Individual chapters of the book adhere 
mainly to European branches of critical and constructivist security studies, 
through which they look at some of the salient topics of Central European 
security politics.
The distinction between internal and external security issues is employed 
throughout the book for analytical purposes. Under this framework, alliance 
building, security guarantees, “special relationships,” the relational politics 
of identity, and relations with major powers – documented in the book on 
the case of Latvia’s relations with United States – are examples of external 
security issues. Various pressing domestic security challenges, illustrated 
on the case of Hungarian far-right movements and their activities towards 
the Roma minority, are examples of internal security issues. At the same 
time, the book does not attempt to draw a line between internal and 
external security issues and each case also discusses overlaps between the 
two and defies simple distinctions.
Finally, the book calls into attention broader theoretical and methodologi-
cal questions of the study of contemporary security issues in the region. 
Examples of a specific marginalized community and the security bureau-
cracy of Slovakia demonstrate how primarily local issues point to broader 
societal dynamics and are in a way illustrative of developments in other 
places of the region. These examples also demonstrate the transcending 
character of contemporary security issues in contrast to a simple internal-
versus-external dichotomy.
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1 Central European Security Challenges:
 Internal and External Threats to the Region through
 the Lenses of Contemporary Security Theories
Jan Daniel and Richard Q. Turcsányi
It would be awkward to observe an emotional discussion between Greeks and 
Spaniards on the meaning of “Southern Europe”1 or between Dutch and French 
on the borders of “Western Europe,” Yet the borders and meaning of “Central 
Europe” have been extremely attractive topics for many intellectuals – and not 
just from the region itself (see e.g. Sinnhuber 1954; Ash 2001; Drulák – Šabič 2012). 
Conceptual uncertainties are present on an even larger scale with the second 
crucial concept of this book – security – which is widely described as essentially 
“contested” and has brought endless discussions in the fields of security studies, 
international relations, and political science (see among many others Baldwin 
1997; Huysmans 1998; Wolfers 1952). 
Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this book to provide an exhaustive 
elaboration of both the state of contemporary security research and a comprehensive 
discussion on the concept of Central Europe. Our aim is more limited, and aspires 
to use various theories of contemporary critical and constructivist security studies 
to explore some of the contemporary Central European security issues that can be 
seen as important and in some ways typical for the region. For better illustration, 
we find it valuable to employ a distinction between internal and external security 
issues, although we acknowledge that this duality has been disappearing lately in 
many cases, and especially in Europe (see Bigo 2001). 
Under this framework of ours, alliance building, security guarantees, “special 
relationships,” relational politics of identity, and relations with major powers – 
documented in the chapter by Diāna Potjomkina on the case of Latvia’s relations 
with United States – are examples of external security issues. Various pressing 
internal security challenges are consequently illustrated on the case of Hungarian 
far-right movements and their attempts to blame the Roma minority for the bad 
state of public security and order in the country. In this regard, the issues of radical 
nationalism, minority rights, and the struggle to maintain public order among the 
marginalized communities are shared by most of the states in the region. 
However, at the same time, we are not trying to draw a strict line between 
internal and external security issues, and, indeed, one of the very same chapters 
of this book defies this simple distinction. Diāna Potjomkina in her contribution 
shows how the external security alliance is interpreted in the national arena, and 
how it is partly opposed when the USA proposes a liberal governance agenda 
that interferes with domestic perspectives of politics and sovereignty. In the last, 
1 Even after this term gained special meaning with regards to the recent economic crisis, it still 
does not evoke the debate that “Central Europe” does.
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largely theoretical and methodological, chapter by Václav Walach and Ľubomír 
Lupták, both authors use their own research projects as examples of ways that 
research can in some way transcend the internal/external dichotomy. Walach’s 
research of a specific marginalized community in his hometown is strictly 
local, but points out broader societal dynamics and is in a way illustrative of 
developments in other places of the region. Lupták’s contribution, on the other 
hand, focuses on Slovak security bureaucracies, positioned between the internal 
and external dimensions of (national) security politics and with a substantive role 
in both of them.
Going back to our initial remarks about the contested natures of both security 
and Central Europe, our understanding of the two must be clarified before moving 
any further. Therefore in the scope of this chapter, serving as an introduction, we 
will firstly address various theoretical conceptions of security in contemporary 
constructivist and critical security studies. Afterwards, we will move towards the 
concept of Central Europe and consequently we will present a general framework 
of the linkage between the two.
WHAT YOU SEE IS WHAT YOU GET: THE BROADENING AND WIDENING OF SECURITY 
RESEARCH 
Over the past 20 to 25 years, approaches to security studies, especially from 
the critical and constructivist perspectives, have developed substantially, and 
a short review of this is warranted. Through this brief overview, we would like 
to point out how different conceptions of security and approaches to its study 
have enabled researchers to see relevant issues in a different way. The question 
of methodology, the political relevance of methods chosen, and related research 
problems in security studies is also dealt with in the concluding chapter of this 
publication by Ľubomír Lupták and Václav Walach entitled “Security! How Do 
You Study It?“, where the authors discuss novel ways of approaching the study of 
security issues in the Central European region.
We do not want to subscribe here to a single specific definition of security; 
hence we rather opt for a plurality of possible research programs, some of which 
have been rather neglected in Central European security studies research so far. 
“Traditional” security studies as they developed throughout the Cold War were 
mainly concerned with security defined as military defense against external and 
to a certain degree also internal threats. As Stephen Walt noted in his famous 1991 
article, the main focus of security studies since 1950s was clearly military power 
and war in general (Walt 1991: 212). Researchers thus concentrated on issues such 
as national defense, deterrence, arms races, or nuclear strategy (Buzan – Hansen 
2009: 66–100). In terms of International Relations theory, these “traditional” 
military-focused approaches were connected not only with realism (and its neo-
offshoots) but also with (neo)liberalism and various branches of peace studies 
(Peoples – Vaughan-Williams 2010: 4–6). As far as Central Europe is concerned, 
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these “traditional” approaches with their emphasis on the military, state power, 
and geopolitics can be seen as fairly well established and do not need further 
introduction.2 The study of ongoing discursive struggles between “narrower” 
and “wider” approaches to security can be well noted in the chapter by Diāna 
Potjomkina on the example of Latvia.
Even though Walt (1991: 213) explicitly rejected the “widening” of security 
studies research to include new potential threats, at the time his article was 
published, this development was already taking place and transforming the 
field in a significant way. Twenty years later, this made Tarek Barkawi (2011) 
paradoxically wonder where war had disappeared to from security studies 
theoretical research.3
In the 1990s, security studies were separated from the narrow focus on war 
and military power and, partly as the result of impact of feminist, constructivist, 
post-colonial, and post-structuralist critiques, “widened” and “deepened” (for 
a general overview see for example Buzan – Hansen 2009). The focus on national 
security has been deepened by an emphasis on other security objects beyond 
state – including, for instance, the environment, society, or gender; narrow 
concentration on military security has been widened by researching security in 
the context of, for example, the economy, politics (“regime”), or society and its 
identity (see among others Burgess (ed.) 2010; Buzan et al. 1998; Hansen 2000).
In our book, we adhere mainly to the European branch of critical and 
constructivist security studies, through which we look at some of the salient 
topics of Central European (security) politics. The chapters in this book have been 
influenced mainly by post-structuralism and constructivism, and particularly by 
the three “schools” of critical security studies, nicknamed by the places of their 
origin – Copenhagen, Paris, and Aberystwyth (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006; Wæver 
2004).
The post-structuralist critique in International Relations and security studies 
had already emerged in the late 1980s with important contributions by authors 
such as R. B. J. Walker (1993) and Richard Ashley (1988), who attacked the 
“constructedness” of the (neo)realist view on international politics. Informed by 
authors such as Michel Foucault and his concepts of power and discourse, and 
the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida, these authors focused their criticism on the 
seemingly unchangeable nature of international system composed by competing 
states that rely on a set of discourses creating exclusive binaries of inside and 
outside (or internal and external), self and other, or hierarchy and anarchy. Realist 
theory was seen as treating these binaries as given and in the same time further 
reproduced them.
In security studies, post-structuralist theories were advanced in David Camp-
bell’s (1992) seminal study of US foreign policy, danger, and production of iden-
2 On the other hand, peace studies have never significantly developed in this region.
3 It should, however, be noted that war is still very much present in what is known as “strategic 
studies,” which could be thought as a specific subfield of security studies.
4tity. In relation to Central Europe, these ideas were used by Iver Neumann (1998) 
in his treatise about uses of “the other” in production of “the self.” Specifically, 
Central Europe was interpreted as a discourse that was used by certain post-
communist states to distance from the (“barbaric and culturally inferior”) Russia 
and to get closer to the rest of (Western) Europe. Therefore, to analyze security 
from the post-structuralist point of view is to see it as a productive discourse that 
forms identities, communities, selves and otherness. As security always brings 
a vision of a threat, it also carries the vision of the desired “secured” state and the 
desirable nature of a political community (Aradau – Van Munster 2010).
In the Central European case, post-structuralist research could take, for 
example, the form of an analysis of main threat discourses in various settings, 
their deconstruction, and their relationship to particular deep-seated parts of 
self-identities. While Russia is an obvious example, there could be many “softer” 
threats, such as immigration, crime, specific minorities (Roma, Hungarians, 
Russians, and others), “old Europe,” or the European Union as such, in certain 
moments and discourses.
Constructivism is in International Relations and security studies often labelled 
as a “softer” version of the post-structuralist approach. Certainly, there are 
many similarities and overlaps between these two. However, even though many 
researchers (especially from more critically-oriented strands of constructivism) 
use some post-structuralist theories and vice versa, a few important differences 
exist. Generally, apart from ontological and epistemological issues, constructivists 
share the interest in studying identities, but treat them as norm-producing ideas 
that are pursued by states (or other political communities) and to which states 
adjust their behaviour. On the other hand, post-structuralists treat identities as 
inseparable from the actors’ actions, being in the same time starting point for the 
action and its results, and from the relations of power in the world politics (for 
a detailed elaboration, see Buzan and Hansen 2009).
Various branches of constructivism thus stressed the importance of commonly 
held norms for international politics, or the importance of ideas in foreign and 
security policymaking (among many others, see Adler – Barnett 1998; Fierke 1996; 
Hansen 2006; Katzenstein 2003; Weldes 1996). However, for most constructivists, 
security as a concept is not a crucial object of research. Scholars working within 
this theoretical approach rather study how security issues (like the national 
interest, or certain security-related events) are discursively constituted and 
interpreted (Buzan – Hansen 2009: 198). In the Central European region, this 
could, for example, mean research on the discursive constitution of Polish energy 
security policies (Best 2006), socialization of Central European states in the 
liberal-democratic security norms of transatlantic organizations (Gheciu 2008), or 
among many others, the contradictory discursive interpretation of United States 
as the key security ally of most of the Central European countries in domestic 
discourses, as Diāna Potjomkina nicely shows in this volume.
Most of our studies use concepts deriving specifically from the constructivist 
(and post-structuralist) research associated with Copenhagen School. In addition 
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to its later work on a discursive theory of foreign policy (see Hansen 2006; 
Hansen and Wæver 2003, and Potjomkina’s chapter), the Copenhagen School’s 
main contribution in terms of security studies could be thought as structured 
along three core issues – sectors, regional security complexes, and securitization 
(Wæver2004). The former two come mainly from work of Barry Buzan (for example, 
see Buzan 1983) and highlight specific types of security-related interactions in 
areas beyond state and military security (the economy, the environment, and other 
sectors) and regional interconnectedness of security concerns in these issues. 
Regional security complexes could be then described as a set of units (not only 
states) whose security processes and dynamics are interlinked to the extent that 
they cannot be analyzed separately from one another (see Buzan – Wæver 2003). 
Whether this concept could also be applied to the subregion of Central Europe (for 
this conceptualization, see Cottey 2000) with its fuzzy borders, unclear identity 
(see below), and high level of integration with the rest of European Union is 
a question we have left unanswered here, but are a bit skeptical about. On the 
other hand, we believe and try to show in this book that there are some security 
issues that characterize Central Europe rather well.
Nevertheless, it was the concept of securitization that has both integrated the 
former two concepts in the coherent constructivist theoretical framework and has 
generated the biggest discussion among IR and security studies scholars (Peoples 
– Vaughan-Williams 2010: 75). “Securitization” refers to a process of shifting of 
a given issue from the area of “normal politics” to an emergency area “above 
politics” by presenting it as an existential threat for a given referent object. In 
other words, security is understood as a successful speech act performed by 
a relevant authority and accepted by its audience (Buzan et al. 1998). In studying 
securitization, scholars are thus not interested in security as a sign referring to 
something “more real” (a threat, an event etc.), but in the securitizing act itself – in 
the construction of security. 
The focus in the context of Central European security could be, for example, 
on the question of how certain topics have started to be seen as a security issues 
during the process of accession to EU (Lavenex 2004), how the gas supply from 
Russia has emerged as a security issue and by whom it was addressed as such, or 
identity securitization moves by various nationalist politicians. Focusing on the 
under-researched issue of securitization by non-state extremist groups, Tamás 
Csiki uses his chapter to focus on how Hungarian far-right parties have practiced 
a securitization strategy of the Roma issue for their particular goals.
Since the mid-1990s, the study of securitization as the specific ways of 
constructing security has developed – especially in Europe – into a broad research 
program. Various scholars have tried to address the questions related to the 
nature of audience and context needed for successful securitization to take place 
(Balzacq 2011; Stritzel 2011), securitizing moves that are produced by various visual 
representations rather than by spoken proclamations (Hansen 2011; Williams 
2003), the nature of securitizing moves and their theoretical grounding (Balzacq 
2010; Hansen 2000; Huysmans 2011; Leonard 2010), the process of desecuritization 
6(Aradau 2004; Huysmans 1998; Roe 2004; Salter 2008), or the authority of people 
and groups who are able to make securitizing moves (Berling 2011). It should be 
noted that Tamás Csiki’s chapter in this book also tackles some of these problems, 
providing a rare analysis of securitization by a non-state actor as well as a nuanced 
analysis of the permissive context in which this could occur.
The focus on people responsible for creating “security agendas” and their 
practices is however much more connected with the research program of the 
Paris School as developed by Didier Bigo (1996; 2008; 2013a) and others, and 
later reformulated in a broader, more sociological approach to study of security 
– so-called “International Political Sociology” (IPS) (Balzacq et al. 2010; Peoples - 
Vaughan-Williams 2010: 69). While the Paris School accepts the Copenhagen 
School’s assertion that what counts as security and insecurity is socially 
constructed (especially in more recent works), the scholars of the Paris School 
stress the need to analyze not only speech and discourses, but the broader security 
practices and context in which security practitioners exist and operate. 
In terms of social theory, Bigo and other IPS authors draw heavily on Pierre 
Bourdieu, making use of his concepts of field (briefly, the complex web of social 
relations between actors, structured along unequally distributed resources) and 
habitus (very briefly, actor’s framework of orientation and perception). By using 
these “thinking tools” in tandem with inspirations from other critical theorists 
(such as Michel Foucault), scholars working within this approach show the 
emergence of a transnational European (and increasingly globalized) field of 
security professionals; a blurring of the borders between internal and external 
security; the empowerment of specific types of security professionals; and the 
emergence of illiberal practices that have come with this new security environment 
(Bigo 2013; Bigo – Tsoukala (eds.) 2008; Jabri 2006; Salter ed. 2010; for the Central 
European case see Tóth 2008).
Security for some and at the same time insecurity for others (for example, 
immigrants from non-EU countries in EU immigration security practices) is in 
the view of sociologically-oriented security researchers mainly the result of the 
developments in the field of security professionals. While analyzing security 
and insecurity, it is therefore crucial to study who is making an (in)securitiza-
tion move, under what conditions, towards whom, and with what consequences 
(Bigo 2008: 124). This means studying not only state agencies, but increasingly 
also private security companies and resulting public-private partnerships (Abra-
hamsen and Williams 2011; for a Central European case study, see Bureš 2014). 
To study Central European security issues through the lenses provided by this 
approach means, for example, concentrating on the practices of local security 
bureaucrats and their interaction with European or global fields, as seen in the 
last chapter of this book by Ľubomír Lupták and Václav Walach, who studied 
the case of Slovakian security bureaucracy. Other examples could be an analysis 
of the positioning of various actors within the security field and emergence of 
new actors equipped with a specific type of knowledge (cybersecurity could be 
seen as a typical example in this case), or security practices in places of (per-
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ceived) insecurity – such as political protests, marginalized communities, or bor-
ders with the “dangerous East.”
More than the other two “schools,” the Aberystwyth (or Welsh) School’s 
approach to security studies draws more on Critical Theory as developed by the 
Frankfurt School and neo-Marxism in general. As such, it takes an arguably more 
normative stance towards security, and sees it as a tool for human emancipation 
(Booth 2007: 110; see also the last chapter of this book for a discussion about 
security and emancipation). Security in this approach means an objective absence 
of threats. Emancipation is viewed as the freedom of people (as individuals and 
groups) from physical and social constraints which stop them from carrying out 
what they would freely choose to do. War and physical insecurity is viewed as 
only one of those constraints, the others being poverty, poor education, political 
oppression, and many others. For writers associated with the Aberystwyth 
School, getting rid of these constraints produces what they call true security 
(Booth 1991: 319). However, this means that security cannot be thought exclusively 
as a national security, but should be understood primarily as a security of human 
beings (Wyn Jones 1999: 23). The scope of security studies therefore should be 
scaled down to the level of individuals and in the same time also up to global and 
international level to include all the insecurities relevant in each case. 
To study security critically in the tradition of the Aberystwyth School means 
to uncover the main sources of insecurities, and actively try to change them as 
active and practically-oriented intellectuals. Regarding the example of application 
in Central Europe, Sybill Bidwell and Krzystof Wójtowicz (2004) analyzed the 
non-military insecurities faced by people in this region since the end of the Cold 
War and identified ethnic, cultural, and religious intolerance among the main 
sources of insecurity. For emancipation it is thus necessary to ensure respect for 
group identity, and guarantees of human rights and economic stability. Studies 
using this approach could, however, also be conducted on a much smaller scale, 
such as in the specific location of a small Roma ghetto in the Czech Republic, as 
the chapter by Ľubomír Lupták and Václav Walach very suitably demonstrates.
LOCATING AND CHARACTERIZING A REGION: BUILDING THE CASE OF CENTRAL EUROPE4
Having clarified our theoretical approaches, we still have to clearly define what 
will be meant in this book by “Central Europe” and why. As has already been 
hinted at, this is not an easy task. As early as 1954, Karl A. Sinnhuber noted his 
confusion after he found that in various historical sources the only lands that 
could always be found in “Central Europe” were present-day Austria and the 
Czech Republic, while only territory in continental Europe not being included in 
any was the Iberian Peninsula (Sinnhuber 1954: 20).
4 This section to some extent uses material from previous research of the author: Turcsányi, 
Richard, Runya Qiaoan, and Zděněk Kříž (2014): “Coming from Nowhere: Chinese Perception 
of the Concept of Central Europe.”
8Perhaps part of the explanation of this high level of confusion may be the simple 
fact that as being in the middle of Europe, Central Europe naturally borders all the 
other European regions, such as those of Western, Eastern, Northern, and Southern 
Europe. While all these regions may face difficulties with determining some of their 
borders, the Central European region is unique in that all of its borders are shared with 
other European regions – there is no finite geographical limitation, such as oceans 
or impassable mountain ranges. In fact, taking a stance on determining “Central 
Europe” actually means defining the borders of most of the other European regions.
Paul Robert Magocsi (2005) in his very systematic text on the demarcation of 
Central Europe asserts that, geographically speaking, as many as 16 contemporary 
states would be at least partly found in Central Europe, understood as one of 
the nine pieces into which Europe would be divided from North to South and 
East to West – Poland, western Belarus, western Ukraine, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. Magocsi further divides 
this region into three geographical units – the northern zone, the Alpine-
Carpathian zone, and the Balkan zone, and discusses its manifold religious, 
linguistic, and national characteristics. What is relevant for the purposes of this 
book is the great complexity the region demonstrates along all these spectra and 
their interconnected nature. One example Magocsi discusses is a process when 
a recognized language apparently gives rise to a recognized nationality, or, vice 
versa, the process of when a language gets “de-recognized” due to changed 
political realities, such as in the case of the Serbo-Croatian language after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia.
What makes the region such a complex mixture is its historical experience. 
Norman Davies (1996) discusses in his vast book some of the historical dividing 
lines of Europe. The first is a geographical line between north and south; the 
second, the area between Roman-conquered territory and the outside; the third 
between the denominations of Catholicism and Orthodoxy; the fourth, between 
the lands occupied by the Ottomans; the fifth, regions which underwent the 
first wave of industrialization in the Nineteenth Century; and the sixth, the one 
between east and the west, in the sense of the Cold War division. Without going 
into depth of any of these, the historical fluidity of the Central European region 
and its complex historical legacy is obvious when observing that each of these 
fault lines runs through this region. Indeed, the resulting region is bound to be 
fragmented due to the ambiguous historical legacies that are transferred onto 
often contradictory characteristics. Ironically, this internal heterogeneity may be 
even considered an important characteristic of the region, always lying “in the 
middle” (see Iordachi 2012).
However, while geography obviously plays a role, and so do the history, 
culture, ethnicities, religions and other aspects, it has been argued that regions 
are to a significant extent created as political projects (see Neumann 2001; Hettne 
2005). Here, the concept of Central Europe has a no less turbulent history, and 
one’s point of view effectively determines its perception of the region. Hence 
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for some, Central Europe would be the lands under Habsburg rule; for others, 
it may also include the rest of the German-speaking world and seen as a heir 
to Mitteleuropa, which nevertheless was rather discredited due to the historical 
legacies of the two world wars. For Hungarians, Central Europe may be primarily 
the extension of Hungarian monarchy in the Carpathian Basin, while for Polish 
the legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would be the most important 
historical “ancestral” unit.
It is argued here that the view which has attracted the most followers is the 
one corresponding with how Otakar Halecki5 (1980) explained it back in the 1960s 
– countries or lands in between the great powers, referring especially to Germany 
and Russia, but also (in different eras) the Ottoman or Byzantine Empires. As 
an apparent consequence of this understanding of the region, these countries 
have never played a significant role outside of the regional space, nor have they 
attempted to do so and have found themselves on the receiving end of many 
international conflicts. This understanding of the region is consistent with the 
ideas of thinkers such as Palacký, Masaryk, Piłsudski, Szűcs, and others and, in 
fact, is also in line with how Milan Kundera (1984) approached it in his famous 
essay The Tragedy of Central Europe, which marked the beginning of the new era of 
the concept. Kundera describes Central Europe as the region being geographically 
in the middle of Europe, historically and culturally part of (Western) Europe, yet 
after the World War II being “kidnapped” and (at the time of his writing) being 
politically part of the East.6
It was this understanding of the region which became the predominant 
political project in the post-Cold War for many of the formerly “Eastern European” 
countries. The “othering” of Russia and the communist past of the region could be 
seen as one of the few things that constituted post-Cold War Central Europe and 
are common to most of its states. Moreover, it was not just the former Soviet Union 
and the newly-created Russian Federation, but also less-developed and more 
“problematic” countries – such as in the Balkans – from which the proponents 
of Central Europe wanted to differentiate themselves from. On the other hand, 
a claim to being part of Central Europe seemed to be a path toward the more 
developed West. In this book, we fully acknowledge this constructed nature of 
Central Europe and take it as a reference point for our own demarcation. 
To sum up our understanding of Central Europe, we would like to point out 
that while there are those who understand the region as including Austria and 
Germany and hence redefine the old Mitteleuropa on mostly historical bases, most 
others have seemingly preferred the definition coming from Palacký, Kundera, 
5 It should be however noted, that Halecki divides Europe in four regions – Western, West Central, 
East Central, and Eastern, out of which East Central Europe is what we label here “Central 
Europe.” This approach is in fact present in some other authors’ works as well, although some of 
them use more of the terms at the same time (see e. g. Magocsi 2005).
6 Interestingly, most of Kundera’s original criticism of the West as morally corrupt, opposed to the 
“pure” Central Europe discourse, has been largely lost from the subsequent debate about the 
region.
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and others, and exclude (former) Western-bloc countries from the concept (see also 
Šabič – Drulák 2012). Furthermore, as all of the authors of this book are themselves 
coming from post-communist states, we align ourselves with this (still broad) 
approach; the first criterion we selected to define countries as “Central Europe” 
was former rule by a communist party. Secondly, while explicitly disqualifying 
Russia, we leave the door open to other countries to be included in the region, 
assuming that Central Europe is formed of countries sharing (and acting under) 
certain regional identity and historical experience, although it is not resolved 
what exactly this identity is or should be. As the result of this, we willingly reject 
attempts to draw an “objective” line based solely on historical, cultural, religious, 
ethnic and/or other factors, provided that a shared regional identity includes all 
of these already. This approach leaves the possibility to also include the Baltic 
countries and, to a certain degree, the Balkan countries as well, and perhaps even 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova – although this is extremely rare and would be 
likely disqualified on the basis of regional identity.7
Staking out the frontiers of the region as such enables us to utilize two case 
studies and two subsequent methodological research reports to demonstrate the 
Central European security issues salient at this time. Even covered jointly in the 
final chapter if the “geopolitical” situations of, for example, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Estonia might be different, the topics described by our studies are 
shared to a certain degree by all of the states in the region. In the next section, we 
describe the logic of our case selection and theoretical groundings.
APPROACHING CENTRAL EUROPE’S SECURITY CONCERNS
The basic understanding of the region and its characteristics will be stepping 
stones for the constituted case studies of this book. Each chapter applies a security 
studies’ theory to a specific security issue of a country in the region. We believe 
that an understanding of the region will help readers to make connections between 
the particular studied issues, their broader regional impact, and maybe, for our 
Central European readers, also of their own experience in their countries. This 
allows us in the following chapters to point out some features that are illustrative 
for the security of the region: things such as integration processes, relations with 
great powers, nationalism and minority rights, and security issues at the local 
level. While this choice is the result of the security issues linked to the certain 
characteristic of the region, it also puts together security issues at various levels, 
moving from external issues to internal ones.
First of all and most traditionally, the conceptualization of the region points 
clearly at the geopolitical space between the two major powers – Russia to the 
7 It remains to be seen whether current developments in Ukraine will not result in attempts of the 
pro-Western politicians to apply the label to themselves in an attempt to legitimize their stance. 
A similar process may well also take place in Moldova, which shares historical legacies with 
Romania and has its own separatist fears in its eastern and southern regions.
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east and Germany to the west, and the external dimension of national security. 
Both of these forces imposed great destruction and suffering on the territories “in 
between” in the past with the most obvious example being the period around the 
World War II (see e.g. Snyder 2010). However, due to circumstances of the post-1989 
era and the legacies of communism, it has been Russia that has been taken as the 
major geopolitical threat almost unanimously around the region. Figuring out how 
to prevent Russia from interfering in the domestic affairs of the countries in the 
region after their regaining of functional (or de jure) sovereignty became a major 
national security question immediately after 1989 and it seems that this perception 
is not going to be altered any time soon. Most countries, again, followed the path of 
expelling stationed Russian military and, after brief consideration about remaining 
neutral, moved decisively towards the “West” (i.e. mainly NATO and the USA in 
regard to security), calling for explicit security guarantees.
Representative of the reflection on the role of Western allies for Central 
Europeans, the following chapter by Diāna Potjomkina, “Fully Appreciated with 
Time? The Role of the United States of America in Latvia’s Security Discourse” 
presents more specific insight into the role and the perception of the US in a single 
country of the region – Latvia – since its independence in the early 1990s. The 
author demonstrates on a number of cases how in different times the perception 
of the US evolved in the domestic discourse, from being an unquestioned security 
guarantor in less certain times towards a more pragmatic relationship in the time 
after joining NATO, when Latvia considered itself to be generally safe. Thereafter, 
Diāna Potjomkina’s chapter shows the uneasiness on the part of local elites when 
it came to external interference in topics that were traditionally understood 
as internal affairs. Consequently, after joining the “West,” symbolized by the 
entrance to the EU and NATO, the general perception of the “Eastern” threat 
among countries in the region significantly decreased, at least for the time being. 
The recent situation in eastern Ukraine and the reaction of some Central European 
countries shows that the image of the Russian threat is still very much present, at 
least among part of the domestic elites, and may be invoked at any moment.
With the Obama Administration in the US, it may be questioned how this 
“special relationship” of Central European countries with the US has developed 
since the President visibly moved his major attention elsewhere, and has not shown 
particular interest in forging the relationship with the region (Rhodes 2012). Also, 
since the integration into the western organizations was achieved, some Central 
European countries seem to have lost a broader foreign and security policy vision 
and have fallen into a sort of ontological insecurity about their place in the world 
and in Europe. This was followed in some cases by foreign political passivity, 
reactionarism, nationalism, and populism, and/or by the state being captured by 
economic elites (Handl – Hynek eds. 2013; Innes 2014). Yet, obviously, the ongoing 
crisis in Ukraine seems to have contributed a major input into this consideration 
of regional countries and has affected the approach of Western Europe and the 
US toward this region, symbolized at the most visible level by the introduction of 
sanctions and a stepping-up of the military presence.
12
Another factor which has been identified above as an important regional 
characteristic is the diverse ethnic structure. While during the previous century, 
ethnic diversity of the region decreased significantly especially during and 
immediately after World War II, issues regarding national minorities and their 
treatment remained present in almost every part of the region. One example 
of historical legacy is Hungary and its relations with neighbours related to the 
huge territorial losses after the World War I, which left millions of Hungarians in 
bordering countries. Similar problems can be found in relations between Russian 
populations living in newly independent countries, especially in the Baltics. 
Ethnicity and revived nationalism were also at the core of the still largest recent 
bloodshed in the region, which took place in the area of former Yugoslavia and 
has not been resolved entirely even today. 
Closely connected to both the ethnic structure and the processes of integration 
throughout the region are issues regarding the Roma people, who have been 
living scattered around the region for centuries. In different time periods Roma 
lived in different conditions, yet what may be the constant is their out-class status 
on the margins of societies. This position has become particularly visible after 
1989, and in many instances has spiralled into open hostility and even violence, 
resulting in labels of “shame” on the continent and particularly Central Europe 
(The Guardian 2010; Popov 2011). This is the second issue we would like to cover 
here in greater detail, given its importance for the region. Tamás Csiki in his 
contribution to this book named “Securitizing the Roma of Hungary” presents 
one study of how a Roma issue was securitized during the period leading up to the 
2010 parliamentary elections in Hungary by various extreme right-wing political 
parties and movements and how, consequently, the government intervened and 
thus possibly prevented further outbreak of the violence. However, Csiki also 
shows how this securitization move was enabled by the popular underlying 
prejudices against Roma communities. What connects these ethnically-based 
issues is their re-appearance after the falls of communist regimes. Lonnie Johnson 
(2002) put this more straightforward than anyone else when he claimed that these 
problems are not results of communism. Being frozen and unsolved during the 
communist decades (which may in some aspects add to their difficulties), their 
roots go into more distant past and neither post-1989 or communist eras should 
be solely blamed for it.
As it was already noted, this book is not trying to present a comprehensive 
account of all the present-day security threats in the Central Europe, which is not 
possible given its limited scope. Although it is necessary to start every analysis 
of a security situation with the objective data on the ground, we believe it is at 
least equally important – if not more – to be conscious about the theoretical and 
methodological background with which security issues are approached. This 
is also the point of our concluding chapter, where Václav Walach and Ľubomír 
Lupták sketch a framework for future critically-oriented security research in 
Central Europe. Giving the examples of their own research, they call for more 
theoretically and methodologically sound scholarship oriented towards relevant 
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local, national and regional issues, which has been relatively scarce in the region 
up to this point. It is worth mentioning that their research projects are themselves 
very much grounded in Central European experiences. Walach investigates the 
everyday insecurities of a specific marginalized Roma community and how the 
meaning of security is constructed among its members. In this sense, his research 
fruitfully complements Csiki’s study of securitization and shows a different 
approach to this issue. Lupták in the same chapter reflects on his previous career in 
the Slovak security apparatus and autoethnographically explores the production of 
meaning within the security bureaucracy. While this research does not seem at first 
sight to be specific for Central Europe as such, Lupták shows how the professionals 
of (in)security, who mediate the transfer of security meaning between external 
and internal realms, are deeply embedded in the context of post-communist 
transformation and adaptation to the Western security discourses and practices. 
The aim of this publication is therefore to shed more light on specifically chosen 
(and in some ways representative) security issues which would demonstrate 
some of the internal and external security issues of Central European countries as 
grasped by some contemporary approaches to security studies and international 
relations research. In this light, this chapter presents a very brief introduction 
of the security challenges the region of Central Europe faces, especially in those 
aspects which may be regarded as “characteristic” for this region.
LOOKING AHEAD: CENTRAL EUROPE, UKRAINE, AND NEW PATHWAYS OF RESEARCH
At the time of preparing this book for publication, the crisis in Ukraine started 
and grew up to the level of being the biggest security crisis in Europe since the 
end of the Cold War, leading some to announce the ending of the “post-Cold War 
era” (see Friedman 2014; Al Jazeera 2014); others even began to draw parallels 
with World War II – interestingly, both Russian President Putin (BBC 2014) and 
NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen (Traynor 2014). In fact, even though critical 
security studies notoriously have a “blind spot” with regards to large-scale 
armed conflicts (see Barkawi 2011), the developments in Ukraine could be also 
interpreted by many of the concepts presented in this introduction and which are 
under deeper scrutiny throughout the book. 
Ukraine has been long divided between its eastern and western regions, 
which have struggled to be aligned with either Russia or the rest of the Europe. 
This internal division is very much in line with ethnic, linguistic, religious, or 
otherwise identity-related issues, with some important economic factors resulting 
from the post-Soviet transformation playing roles. We believe that an analysis 
of developments in eastern Ukraine should be done not only from the crude 
geopolitical and materialist point of view, but also from more nuanced theoretical 
and methodological positions. There is much to be yet written about strategies of 
discursive construction of space, enemies and friends on both sides, or about the 
lived insecurities on the ground. 
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Apart from being able to understand the current situation in Ukraine using 
the concepts and knowledge of Central Europe, it is clear that this development 
does and will influence the general security environment in the region. As the 
most texts of this book had been written before the crisis in Ukraine escalated, it 
is not addressed explicitly in most of the texts besides this introduction. 
Nonetheless, we believe that a sincere understanding of some of the contem-
porary region’s security issues and their in-depth analyses using the current the-
oretical and methodological approaches may be of significant use when trying to 
put (not only) the Ukrainian development into the context. It is thus our foremost 
hope that readers will find this book both as a useful probe into this vibrant re-
gion (which, unfortunately, has been present at the beginning and often the focus 
of many of the world’s bloodiest endeavours) as well as a guidebook to ways to 
study it. This book should thus also serve as an invitation to more “reflexive,” 
critical, and constructivist theorizing on Central European politics and security 
issues. As we try to show on the next pages, approached by these theories and 
methods, the region could still be a rich source of fresh ideas and perspectives, 
perhaps not the “pure” European one that Kundera once argued for in his famous 
essay, but certainly not less interesting.
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2 Fully Appreciated with Time? The Role of the   
 United States of America in Latvia’s Security Discourse1
Diāna Potjomkina
What has been the role of the United States of America in Latvia’s security discourse? 
According to the official, and academic, interpretation, it is first and foremost 
a “strategic partnership,” a highly trustworthy guarantee of Latvia’s national 
independence. However, a more in-depth analysis allows us to deconstruct this 
concept of partnership and to elucidate alternatives, showing the broad spectrum 
of discourses and sub-discourses which underlie Latvian-American relations. 
This article shows how the narrow, “traditionally” military-strategic concept 
of security relations with the US has been defended and contested by different 
official and non-official actors in Latvia, and what changes (if any) have appeared 
over the years. 
The article is structured as follows. First, it begins with outlining the theoreti-
cal approach – research is grounded in consistent constructivism, synthesizing it 
with moderate poststructuralism insofar as the epistemological and ontological 
preferences of different theorists prove compatible. Security is treated as a so-
cially constructed phenomenon, the extreme form of identity, with a potentially 
limitless scope of meanings – it can refer to state sovereignty, culture, political 
independence, economic well-being etc., so virtually anything can be securitized. 
Second, main trends in Latvia’s foreign and security policy are briefly outlined 
and conceptualized, in order to provide the reader with a theoretically informed 
background for further discussion. Latvia’s policy has been analysed quite wide-
ly, including from the constructivist perspective. However, in many cases it has 
been simplified, focusing either on confrontation with Russia and the “return 
to Europe”, or, alternatively, on “postmodern” changes and new security priori-
ties (see e.g. Berg 2008, Holtom 2005, Lejiņš 1999, Mälksoo 2010, Möller 2002, and 
Paulauskas 2006). These reports actually do highlight two, coexisting discursive 
streams in Latvian foreign policy, which we will look at more closely. 
The main part of this paper consists of three case studies, each characteristic 
of a certain period in Latvia’s foreign and security policy and of Latvian-US 
relations in particular. They correspond to, respectively, the period before Latvia’s 
membership in the EU and NATO, and independence itself, was assured (during 
the period of the US-Baltic Charter, 1998); the “transition period” just before 
joining both organizations (around the time of the Iraq War, 2003); and the time 
after accession, when the security situation of the country had been (objectively) 
1 This chapter draws on the Master’s thesis developed by the author at Rīga Stradiņš University: 
„The Role of the United States of America in Latvia’s Security Discourse”, 2012.
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improved2 (using a speech by the US Ambassador to Latvia against corruption 
in 2007 as a touchstone). The methodology used in this research corresponds to 
Lene Hansen’s second model of discourse analysis, encompassing not only the 
immediate decision-makers but also the political opposition and opinion leaders 
from among the broader society (Hansen 2006). The case studies cannot of course 
be deemed fully representative, but they do allow us to discern some more 
general patterns in the development of Latvian policies – and these patterns may 
be applicable beyond Latvia’s borders as well. 
CONSISTENT CONSTRUCTIVISM AND SECURITY DISCOURSE(S)
The theoretical basis for this research has been primarily based on works of con-
sistent constructivists, especially Nicholas Greenwood Onuf and Jeffrey T. Check-
el (e.g. Checkel 2007, Onuf 1989), synthesized with moderate poststructuralists, 
such as Lene Hansen. The main criteria here have been common ontological and 
epistemological grounds / complementarity, not the official self-identification of 
the authors. What emerges out of this synthesis is a broad and flexible theoretical 
paradigm.
Consistent constructivism belongs to the broader theoretical approach of so-
cial constructivism, which appeared at the end of the Cold War and soon gained 
popularity thanks to its capacity to explain not only continuity but also changes 
in world politics. Among the many streams within social constructivism, the con-
sistent strand is marked by its consistent focus on the supreme role of ideational 
factors over material ones, and on the key role of language (norms, discourse) 
which allows actors to comprehend the world and act towards it. This does not 
mean that material factors are disregarded; indeed they are often reflected in the 
discourse, and the discourse also relies upon material factors in order to imple-
ment rules in practice (Onuf 1998 and 2002). Actors can also attempt to strengthen 
their own material positions, but ideational factors remain more important. Thus, 
changes in material circumstances (like, in this case, Latvia’s accession to the EU 
and NATO) can only have importance through discourse. 
Consistent constructivism also pays attention to both components of the 
agent-structure dilemma. Language is the link which connects the structure 
and the agent, and in principle, their relations are mutually constitutive, and in 
any case where norms are involved, we can speak about relations of power and 
rule. Agents can be influenced by the broader ideational structure, or by other 
agents’ views, and this can occur to different extents. Sometimes, external norms 
change agents’ identities (fundamental views), but sometimes they have only 
a superficial influence on their behaviour and can be discarded when the pressure 
2 This reference does not go against the principles of consistent constructivism, as this approach 
does not deny a certain role of “material” factors – only stressing that in the absolute majority of cases, 
it is not these factors per se that are important, but actors’ interpretations of them (as Onuf (2002) 
asserts, a speech act is an action in itself).
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diminishes. Jeffrey T. Checkel therefore distinguishes among actors guided by 
a “logic of appropriateness” and those led by a “logic of consequences” (Checkel 
2007). In some, albeit rather uncommon, cases, the structure can be so solidified 
that it fully determines the views held by the actors, meaning that no independent 
agency exists. But in most cases, agents actively reproduce the structure, and they 
can, and do, bring changes to it. Various ideational structures can co-exist and 
interact (Hansen 2006, Onuf 1989). 
What does this imply for security discourse analysis? Security is a socially 
construed notion, not a given, and actors can securitize very different aspects of 
life, such as military security, economics, environment, language, culture, etc. The 
exact understanding must be determined empirically in each case. Importantly, 
security is normally defined against some “Other,” and, by defining who is the 
“Other,” the agent at the same time defines his/her own identity. Thus, from the 
policymakers’ point of view, a conflict situation may provide a raison d’être not 
only for the state, but also for themselves as its lawful representatives. They can 
use their own needs/understanding of security and extrapolate these as needs of 
the country as a whole. Security rationales, in politics, can be used as justification 
for mobilizing all available public resources, sometimes for the agents’ own 
purposes; simultaneously, decision-makers also tend to de-politicize the issue, 
avoiding any questions (Hansen 2006). Thus, we can see security as the supreme 
justification for rule of some norms, and subjects, over others. 
Methodologically, recognizing this pluralism and the different degrees to 
which norms can be internalized warrants close research, both of discourses for 
their own sake, as well as their contextual framework, in which process-tracing 
can be employed. In this article, both methods have been applied. As mentioned 
above, discourses from various governmental and non-governmental players 
were analyzed, taking into account external discursive influence(s) as well. This 
corresponds to the second analytical model identified by Lene Hansen – researching 
not only official speeches and documents, but also discourses of the political 
opposition, interest groups, mass media, and other stakeholders, all of whom have 
or potentially can have an influence on policies (Hansen 2006). Available official 
materials, press articles, and other publications relevant to the case studies (about 
a year-long period in each case) have been used. The focus of the research therefore 
is on the interaction among different discourses and possible changes caused by it. 
LATVIA-U.S. RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW AND THE DISCURSIVE CONTEXT
Latvia’s discourses regarding the United States are of course part of broader 
discursive streams which exist in the country’s foreign policy. These, along with 
key events in relations between Latvia and the US, are briefly identified here in 
order to provide a background for research on the three particular cases. 
Latvia’s foreign and security policy has been analyzed rather frequently, but, 
as mentioned, many of these research works seem to exhibit one common fault: 
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oversimplification. Analysts tend to simplify not only Latvia’s external policies, 
but also the processes in the Latvian political space, asserting that a certain 
political stance is supported by the entire elite, or even “the state” as a whole. This 
author invites scholars to adopt a more complex view of the situation, recognizing 
that in Latvia, two broad discursive streams (each containing various discourses 
and subdiscourses) exist simultaneously. For the sake of simplicity, here they are 
termed, respectively, the “modern” and the “postmodern/postmodernized” – 
focusing on their respective approach to security. These terms draw on the classical 
understanding of modernism and postmodernism in International Relations, as 
described by, for example, Robert Cooper (2003) and Maria Mälksoo (2010). Here, 
the “modern world” is exemplified by the balance of power and a state-centric 
international system, and the state is considered the main security object; this is 
contrasted with the “postmodern” one, seen in supranational processes such as 
European integration, the transcending of state sovereignty, and instead bringing 
the individual to the forefront. The specification and application of these concepts 
to Latvia is the author’s initiative, based on several years of researching Latvian 
foreign policy (e.g. Potjomkina 2010). 
The first discursive stream tends to exhibit a very categorical, Manichean 
understanding of security, which takes the state as the primary object of security 
and focuses on its confrontation with other states (therefore, “modern”). In 
practice, this stream has highlighted actual (not potential), omnipresent threats 
to the state and the nation, and has had marked existential elements. Drawing 
parallels with classical theories of International Relations, it could be rather 
precisely identified as “realist;” even if sometimes it refers to liberal democratic 
values, this is mainly done in line with the “clash of civilizations” thesis, trying 
to justify Latvia’s belonging to the West and alien nature of the dangerous East. 
One fundamental impact on the “modern” discourse was left by the Cold War 
and Soviet occupation, which strengthened the already existing mistrust and 
fear of Russia. Importantly, during the occupation period, the Latvian diaspora 
in the West (including in the US) adopted, to a great extent, the predominant 
anti-Soviet discourse and later, coming back after the restoration of Latvia’s 
independence, influenced its foreign politics in this direction. Thus, the “modern” 
discourse has been markedly “pro-Western,” trying to detach Latvia from the 
USSR temporally and from Russia spatially and to secure national sovereignty 
through the means of Euro-Atlantic integration, especially NATO. These aims 
were officially pursued with a great rigor that even led some authors to speak 
about “militarization of the mind” (Möller 2002). Admittedly, NATO, the EU, and 
other external partnerships were seen, to a large degree, in an instrumental way. 
No deeply internalized collective identity with the Allies existed in the 1990s, 
although this was to some extent obscured by the pro-integration rhetoric. The 
situation did not change fundamentally after Latvia’s accession to the EU and 
NATO in 2004 – the focus still was on guaranteeing Latvia’s security and a good 
standing within the Alliance. Sometimes, this was done with “doublespeak” – 
voicing more “postmodern,” liberal democratic arguments in discussions with 
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Western partners but maintaining the more nationally-oriented and securitized 
discourse domestically. 
In this discursive stream, the USA emerged as one of the primary, or the primary 
guarantor of Latvia’s security and independence – with a great emphasis on the 
“principled” American support throughout the years. In 1940, Sumner Welles, 
US Secretary of State at the time, was the first representative of the international 
community to condemn Soviet aggression. The US was instrumental in preserving 
the independent diplomatic representation of Latvia which existed throughout 
the Cold War (and supported the missions in other states), and maintained 
a strict non-recognition policy towards “Soviet Latvia.” It also provided valuable 
assistance in the restoration of Latvia’s independence, the subsequent withdrawal 
of the Russian army, and Latvia’s accession to NATO, among others – even if in 
practice, sometimes the US policy was less altruistic than many Latvian decision-
makers would like to believe. In particular, the foreign policy of the George W. 
Bush Administration resonated very well with “modern” Latvian beliefs thanks 
to its strong geopolitical dimension covered by liberal democratic values. Also, 
relations with the US, being bilateral by definition, must have been somewhat easier 
to comprehend, and develop, than the complex policies of multilateral integration. 
At the same time, issues such as economic cooperation, education, democracy, 
civil society development, and the fight against corruption, which had already 
been on the bilateral agenda in the 1990s (e.g. Meyer 2000–2001), did not receive 
the focused attention of these players. They also tended to sideline postmodern 
security initiatives promoted by the US, e.g. the Northern Europe Initiative, which 
was launched by the US in 1997 and was remarkably transnational in its outlook. 
Political and military issues remained virtually the alpha and omega of Latvia’s 
priorities in relations with the US. 
In contrast, the “postmodern(-ized)” discursive stream first and foremost pays 
attention to internal and transnational (non-traditional) threats, such as organized 
crime, environmental hazards, and – distinctively – socioeconomic problems. 
The focus on national sovereignty as the supreme value is less pronounced, 
with a more open perception of national borders and greater focus on security 
problems of a socioeconomic nature. The intensity of securitization is normally 
somewhat lower than in the case of the “modern” view, and the focus often is 
on potential future gains. However, in contrast to the usual understanding of 
“postmodernism,” many representatives of this approach are still not willing to 
“lose” sovereignty to supra-national institutions and continue to prioritize the 
state as a whole (hence, “postmodernized” to reflect the fact that the postmodern 
dimension has been taken on partially, somewhat artificially). Moreover, liberal 
democratic values are generally not used as the guideline in foreign policy; most 
often, readiness to cooperate with all states and regimes is proclaimed, especially 
if it brings economic benefits (Cooper 2003). If the first discursive stream is closer 
to realism, then this one hews towards liberalism.
In Latvian politics, the “postmodern(-ized)” stream appeared by the early 
1990s and has remained ever since. Even if the major political forces did not 
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openly doubt Latvia’s membership in the EU and NATO as the prime foreign 
policy goal, they still had different opinions on the preferred form and results of 
this integration. Priority was put on economic issues, and these players worked to 
construct Latvia’s place as that of a bridge “The Amber Gate” between the West and 
the East. To some extent, was possibly was caused by purely ideational reasons, 
but the “pragmatic” desire to maintain links with Russia and CIS countries also 
must have played a role. At the same time, external influences on Latvia and its 
society were, in many cases, viewed skeptically, maintaining a strong focus on 
sovereignty (and probably unwillingness on the part of national elites to dilute 
their own influence). After 2004, this discursive stream became more prominent. 
Latvia’s security concerns were alleviated to a great extent, and accession to the 
EU and NATO already had taken place, so “principles” could give way to purely 
economic considerations. However, for these players, the USA still has not become 
a high-profile priority, apparently because the American economic and social 
presence in Latvia is not as significant compared to other European states. 
These two discursive streams were not the only perspectives, however. 
Another important tendency, which had appeared even at that time, was 
passivity both in political circles (the process of Euro-Atlantic integration was 
virtually monopolized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lejiņš and Ozoliņa 
1998)) and in the broader society. It created an enabling environment for a closed, 
non-transparent process of making decisions on these fundamental choices of 
Latvia’s foreign policy, and the often-quoted societal “consensus” on EU and 
NATO accession was rather a consequence of depolitization (Heinemann-Grüder 
2002, Ozolina 1996, Ozolina 1998, Urbelis 2003). Against this complex background, 
we can turn to the three case studies which give us a clue to whether, how, and for 
what reasons the predominant, “modern” Latvian view of the US changed over 
the years. 
THE US-BALTIC PARTNERSHIP CHARTER, 1997–1998
“A Charter of Partnership among the United States of America and the Republic 
of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania,” signed on January 16, 
1998, came at a difficult time for Latvia. By then, the European Commission had 
announced that Latvia was not ready to start accession talks with the EU, nor 
was it included in the first NATO enlargement round; overall, the stance of many 
Western allies on these matters was rather hesitant. In contrast, in the autumn 
of 1997, Russia offered its security guarantees to the Baltic States, which were 
quickly turned down by Latvia. In this context, the Charter was an important 
manifestation of continued support by the United States as it declared, “[t]he 
United States of America has a real, profound, and enduring interest that in 
the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and security of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania,” and “welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO” (Charter, 1998). It also asserted 
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that no third country (i.e., Russia) will have influence over integration efforts of 
the Baltic States. Admittedly, an entire section of the Charter was dedicated to 
economic cooperation (supporting, inter alia, the Baltics’ accession to the WTO, to 
the OECD, and an increase in American investments), but, as will be seen further, 
this fact remained largely unnoticed. 
The process of preparing the Charter was, however, a rather closed one. The 
first news on the document appeared in the Latvian press in early 1997, but only 
in June was more precise information released. The Charter was classified until 
its signing by the presidents, and in Latvia, it was not even subject to a discussion 
in the Saeima (Parliament) – six days before it was signed, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee complained about not having seen the text (Kuzmina 1998). The main 
role in the talks was undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together 
with the President, Guntis Ulmanis. Under such conditions, the broader society, 
quite predictably, was not involved. The only attempt at dialogue between state 
institutions and society was an article by the Foreign Minister in one of the leading 
daily newspapers (Birkavs 1998), and it simply aimed to unilaterally explain the 
importance of the document. The monopolization of the process by the executive 
branch severely limited the discursive field. Moreover, as seen from the Latvian 
mass media, the official US discourse was adopted in Latvia rather uncritically. 
From the very beginning of discussions, the Charter was seen from the 
“traditional” security perspective as a proof of the much-needed American interest 
in the Baltics. Some criticism appeared on the part of officials in the spring of 1997, 
but it was aimed not against the conceptual basics of the Charter, but instead 
against their perceived weakness. As statements from Foreign Minister Valdis 
Birkavs indicate, he fully supported the Charter, and at the same time stressed 
it must become more substantial, possibly even legally binding (Tihonovs 1997). 
(In the end, the Charter was adopted as a political declaration.) A few other 
players, outside of the formal circle of decision-makers, were even more critical 
about the alleged hesitance of the US to offer stable guarantees to Latvia. Still, 
also these belonged to the “traditional” discourse and doubted the actual role of 
the US in relation to Latvia, rather than what was desired. Questions posed by 
journalists in the period before signing the Charter also related to the particulars 
– who will sign the Charter and when; how strong the guarantees provided will 
be, etc. Almost no questions were asked about the need for the document as such, 
or about other fields in which Latvian-US relations should be developed. It seems 
the mass media themselves did not even try to look for alternative opinions. Rare 
mentions of the need for promoting economic relations between the countries 
and American investments were also generally related to the wish for a greater 
American presence. 
As the talks on the Charter progressed, the predominant pattern of discourse – 
reflecting the fundamentally positive attitude of the executive branch and the 
official American rhetoric – remained the same. Moreover, the document began 
to be seen as the proof that Latvia was being heard and its concerns were being 
taken into account, exemplifying the “new quality” of the Latvian-US relations 
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(Latvijas Vēstnesis 1997, Zeikate 1997). The Russian factor, predictably, was often 
referred to, positioning the Charter as a guarantee against Russia’s attempts to 
hamper Latvia’s accession to NATO. In fact, it was directly counterpoised to 
Russia’s aforementioned offer of security guarantees (Tikhonov 1997). Thus, the 
Charter, to a certain extent, was interpreted by Latvians to be tougher than it 
actually was, since at that point, the US actually took care not to isolate Russia. 
The US also emerged as the main, almost the sole, guarantor of Latvia’s security 
and independence, and as the example for other, more reluctant Western 
states and as the true beacon of the Western values. It was ascribed the role 
of NATO leader, hoping that other NATO member states would follow the US 
lead. As Foreign Minister Birkavs said, “sometimes it seems that the US better 
remembers our place in Europe than the European Union member states” 
(Birkavs in Apinis and Lejiņš, 1997: 10–1). At the same time, the importance of the 
US-backed Northern Europe Initiative (which also appeared at that time) was 
relegated to the background. The main priority was to escape “regionalization” 
of Latvian security, meaning that neither cooperation with other states of the 
Baltic Sea Region, nor the Charter itself, could be seen as a replacement for the 
EU and NATO membership (Birkavs 1998). Additionally, a symbolic dimension 
also appeared in the debate, showing how the US never accepted Latvia’s 
occupation. 
Thus, until the Charter was signed, the dominating positive discourse 
remained practically unchallenged and unchanged. There were only a few 
articles which dared to doubt the importance of the document or the overall 
strategic role of the USA in Latvia’s security – but again, in principle, these players 
supported Latvia’s pro-Western orientation. Research for this article uncovered 
only one article in the Latvian language which explicitly questioned Latvia’s goal 
becoming a NATO member (Tarvids, 1997) (more criticism was voiced by the 
Russian-language media which was clearly drawing on arguments employed in 
Russia.) The criticism is quoted here to show that no overwhelming unity existed 
in Latvia, but in fact it was barely notable in the overall debate. 
The signing of the Charter become a major discursive event, attracting high 
media attention – it was even translated live on Latvian state TV. The full text was 
published immediately by several media outlets. Still, the predominant discourse 
did not change. Somewhat greater attention was paid to the economic aspects of 
the document, and some insignificant criticism still appeared, but generally, the 
final document was interpreted both by decision-makers and by the media as 
a major achievement. The role of the Charter as a guarantee of Latvia’s (traditional) 
security was not doubted. The main political forces, who now had the chance to 
get acquainted with the text, also voiced their support (although it was impossible 
to pinpoint the opinion of one of them, the National Harmony Party, which was 
mainly oriented towards the Russian-speaking minority). However, interestingly, 
the opinions from representatives of the broader society – which, at that time, 
were also featured in the media – had a larger proportion of critical views (Funts 
1998a, 1998b, Lauku Avīze 1998, Ļuta 1998, Diena 1998).
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Against this overall rather homogeneous and pro-American discursive 
background, one last example should be mentioned in relation to this case study. 
In February 1998, vigorous discussions took place, both in the Parliament and in 
the press, on possible Latvian support to the US operation on disarming Iraq. The 
question, in this case, was whether to allow Latvian soldiers to participate in an 
international peacekeeping mission. The president, the ministers of defense and 
of foreign affairs and other policymakers were in favor of such a decision, citing 
both moral and international security arguments and also taking the issue as 
a practical embodiment of the commitments undertaken in the Charter (Saeima 
1998). Still, the criticism in this case was much more noticeable – possibly because 
the decision would have a very immediate impact. It came both from some 
Members of the Parliament (most of them – from the “postmodern” parties) and 
from some media. This particular instance already offers a certain bridge to the 
next case study. 
LATVIA’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE IRAQ WAR, 2002–2003
The second case study is rather characteristic of the first change in Latvian dis-
courses regarding foreign policy and security, which came with the accession to 
the EU and NATO. Latvia, with its heated internal debates, was very similar to 
other countries in Europe and around the world, in that the opposition and the 
broader society did not hesitate to counter the official pro-Bush, pro-war orienta-
tion. However, the Iraq case came at a time when many players in Latvia were still 
insecure about the country’s future. Full Euro-Atlantic integration came closer to 
being a reality, but Latvia’s accession was not yet ratified. Taking into account the 
hesitance in admitting Latvia to these organizations, which had been previously 
shown by many Western partners, certain doubts were understandable. Russia, 
meanwhile, became more and more assertive internationally. As a result, many 
Latvian policymakers, in line with the “modern” worldview, clearly continued to 
rely on the USA as the main guarantor of Latvia’s security and independence, and 
considered it their duty to counter any criticism against this strategic ally. 
Before the war erupted, the United States and its allies were trying to 
legitimize the invasion through a UN resolution. At the same time, they put 
forth the view that the UN’s inability to make a decision should not obstruct 
the disarmament, and when it became clear that a new resolution would not 
be adopted, the coalition declared that those resolutions which were already 
in place justified the use of force. Ziemele (2003, 2005) provides a well-argued 
opinion that the Iraq operation was against international law, and it was actually 
the first case when Latvia openly confronted the United Nations. However, as 
will be seen later, international law concerns played a far less important role for 
Latvian executives than the position of the US did. Latvia, according to Donald 
Rumsfeld’s famous classification, could now feel itself as a part of the strong and 
principled “new” Europe, and it could consider the US to be not only its protector 
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but also its partner. The “modern” forces readily embraced the changes in the US 
discourse which came with the George W. Bush Administration, which allowed 
them to voice their own “modern” discourse even more actively than before. 
A neoconservative mixture of liberal democratic values and geopolitics was the 
argumentation employed by the US officials to justify the global role of America, 
and it was also the reasoning which the Latvian officials used to explain their 
own desire to establish partnership with the US and accede to NATO. At the same 
time, the US consistently maintained its support for Latvia’s NATO membership. 
The first time Latvia officially voiced support for the US on the Iraq issue was at 
the UN General Assembly in September 2002. It was done by the president, Vaira 
Vīķe-Freiberga, who was notable for her active engagement in foreign policy and 
her hawkish, “modernist” views (Diena 2002, Latvijas Valsts prezidents 2002). 
In January-February 2003, Latvia acceded to two Conclusions of the European 
Council which supported the US role in resolution of the conflict. At the same time, 
it went further than the official EU position, co-authoring the so-called Vilnius 
Letter (published on February 5) by ten former Eastern European countries, many 
of them aspiring EU and NATO members. Latvia, along with other signatories, 
expressed its readiness to join the international coalition on disarming Iraq. 
The letter clearly marked a divide in Europe, since at that time, many other 
countries advocated continuation of inspections. 
The actual decision to support the US was made in great haste. On March 
18, 2013, the Cabinet of Ministers decided, by an urgent procedure, to convene 
a session of the Parliament the next day and submitted to it the draft decision “On 
the participation of Latvia in the international operation for the disarmament of 
Iraq.” After long and lively debate on March 19 – in fact, in the first hours of March 
20 – the Parliament adopted the decision “On Latvia’s support to execution of the 
UN resolution No. 1441,” thus allowing Latvian military forces to take part in the 
international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The war started in the 
early morning of the same day. 
This case, however, was different from the previous one, in that discursive 
pluralism was much more pronounced, and the official policies were subjected to 
harsh criticism, coming both from the political opposition and from the broader 
society. In contrast with the Charter case, when the main agents were decision-
makers, this time, a wide range of independent opinions was expressed by policy 
experts, civil society organizations, journalists, and other representatives of 
the society (inter alia through media polls). Representatives of the mass media 
themselves (including the official Latvijas Vēstnesis) reflected diverse viewpoints 
on the issue, including different opinions from elsewhere in the world and not 
only the official US discourse. Interaction among discourses was also more 
pronounced, although here we can rather speak about changes in rhetoric/way of 
argumentation, not in substance. 
The debate on the possible war actually started “from below”, before any pos-
sible Latvian participation in it was even discussed. From the beginning, dis-
content with the US policies was notable – criticizing the US for aggressiveness, 
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a selfish desire to acquire Iraqi oil, the possible negative impact on oil prices and 
the world economy at large, the disregard of public opinion and UN norms, etc. 
The relative importance of each discursive stream is difficult to measure; how-
ever, it seems that at the beginning of the debate, “postmodern(-ized)” arguments 
actually were prevalent. 
This position, however, did not find support in official circles. The position 
taken by the executive was, in stark contrast, strongly supportive of the Bush 
Administration’s policies, and of securitizing Latvia’s own situation. A threefold 
justification was normally offered: 1) the threat which the Saddam Hussein’s re-
gime posed to the world’s, and thus also to Latvia’s, security; 2) the transgressions 
which the Iraqi leader committed against human rights and international norms; 
and 3) in fact, the key one – Latvia’s duty to support its allies, first and foremost 
the US, if it wanted to keep external guarantees to its security. Although offi-
cials sometimes referred, more generally, to “allies” or to NATO, the US clearly 
emerged as Latvia’s main protector, overshadowing any international organiza-
tions (Latvijas Vēstnesis 2003, Saeima 2003). “The US is the main player in this 
game, and we must show our stance” (see Heinacka 2003). As in the previous 
case, this debate often quoted historical facts (in a rather selective interpretation), 
focusing on the US’s continued support for Latvia. Russia continued to feature 
as the major threat to Latvia’s independence, sometimes equating opposition to 
the war to supporting Moscow’s influence (see Saeima 2003). Notably, the official 
discourse found some supporters in the public space, among them political sci-
entists, representatives of the mass media, and members of civil society. It was 
also supported by some reports of the US position. Still, in this case, the official 
discourse was not the dominant one, but one of many. 
First, while continuing to discuss the “modern” discursive stream, it is impor-
tant to note that not all of its representatives supported the war. Some of them ac-
tually considered the US policies to be threatening to Latvia’s interests and called 
for more careful maneuvering among the US and its allies, on the one hand, and 
the European countries critical of the policy on the other. According to this alter-
native view, the Bush Administration was actually weakening the NATO with its 
confrontational stance. In the February 19 debates, more moderate MPs advocated 
providing a non-military contribution to the Iraq operation, in order not to esca-
late the relations with influential European powers (see Saeima 2003). For these 
players, then, the US lost its primary and uncontested role in Latvia’s security, 
and security itself was defined somewhat differently. American policies would be 
evaluated positively only on the condition that Latvia’s relations with other allies 
would not suffer. 
Moreover, various “postmodern/postmodernized” discourses continued to 
play a key role throughout this period. The majority of actors belonging to this 
stream considered the US policies to be threatening Latvia’s, and the world’s, 
interests, by setting a negative precedent in their unauthorized use of force, and 
possibly involving other Muslim nations in the conflict. In contrast to the official 
“modernist” worldview, these forces considered the UN, the EU and various 
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European countries to be the main guarantors of Latvia’s security, putting 
a premium on international law and on Latvia’s Europeanness. Here, one could 
also quote the much-used arguments on the need to solve domestic problems first. 
Economic considerations were also important. Admittedly, some players expressed 
hope that Latvian businesses will be able to take part in Iraq’s reconstruction or 
that support for the US could bring additional American investments to Latvia 
(Elferts 2003, Kilevica 2003, Kuzmina et al. 2003, Latvijas Vēstnesis 2003b, Linuža 
2003). Still, the majority of the opinions were negative, referring to the rise in oil 
prices, the possible negative impact on European economies, etc. The economic 
issues were clearly securitized, thus, in fact, making the US appear as an economic 
threat. And in the Latvian public sphere, there were also other, albeit smaller, 
discourses, which could be described as “postmodern” in the traditional sense of 
the term – meaning a strong focus on needs of the Iraqi society, on international 
norms, and also on the threat to individual Latvian citizens taking part in the 
operation. While many players in Latvia used these normative arguments 
instrumentally (to a lesser or greater extent), others demonstrated a clear “values” 
judgment.
The discursive environment in Latvia, in the context of the war in Iraq, was 
clearly much more diverse and saturated than in the previous case. Still, political 
apathy remained widespread. More radical representatives of both discourses 
actually advocated neutrality in the conflict, as a way to escape unnecessary 
involvement in great powers’ games. And public protests in Latvia, although 
noticeable, were insignificant compared to other countries. To some extent, this 
process must have facilitated the official, top-down style of decision-making. 
As can already be understood from the above, Latvian decision-makers, 
despite widespread political and public opposition, did not change their discourse 
throughout this case. In fact, they openly rejected any need to listen to the public 
opinion, even though polls showed that between 74% and 81% of the inhabitants 
were against the use of military force in Iraq (LETA 2003). The President, Vīķe-
Freiberga, went so far as to “regret” the polarization of opinions, also stating that 
the state officials are authorized, by their initial public mandate, to make any 
decision they consider necessary (Vīķe-Freiberga 2003a, 2003b). To some extent, 
the official discourse tried to provide counterarguments to its critics (e.g. stating 
that Saddam Hussein indeed possessed chemical weapons or that Latvia would 
not be involved in active combat), but this should be seen as a tactical adaptation, 
not as a change in underlying norms. If anything, Latvia’s foreign policy in the 
run-up to March 20 developed in the direction of the more radical, pro-Bush and 
anti-UN modernism. Thus, although the two situations are to a certain extent 
different, the Iraq case shows important continuity with the policy which Latvian 
“modernist” leadership pursued in regard to the US-Baltic Charter. 
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THE ANTI-CORRUPTION SPEECH BY CATHERINE TODD-BAILEY (US AMBASSADOR TO 
LATVIA), 2007 
On October 16, 2007, at the University of Latvia, the Ambassador of the US to 
Latvia, Catherine Todd Bailey, presented her famous speech against corruption, 
“Preserving our Common Values.” This case was one of the few instances after 
Latvia’s accession to the EU and NATO when Latvian-American relations came 
into the spotlight. Despite being, in principle, different from the previous two, it 
also demonstrated some interesting trends in Latvia’s policy towards the United 
States. 
If the previous two cases – the US-Baltic Charter and the Iraq War – were 
related first and foremost to external affairs, then Todd Bailey’s speech had a direct 
domestic importance. Its main thrust was to criticize corruption and the non-
transparent influence of some key figures on national politics, asking Latvians to 
stand for democracy and the rule of law (Todd Bailey 2007). The Ambassador also 
indicated that these developments were incompatible with the “common values” 
held by Latvia and the US. As shown above, these “common values” were actually 
raised in the Latvian-American dialogue already back in the 1990s, when the US 
provided support and assistance for, inter alia, combating corruption. However, 
back then they did not raise public controversy, and any criticism, if it appeared 
at all, remained marginal. In turn, the Todd-Bailey’s speech provoked heated 
discussions on what, if any, would be the desirable influence of the US over Latvia. 
It was also very directly used in political struggles among the parties, since the 
state of democracy and rule of law at that moment was a highly prominent issue 
on the political agenda. 
To provide a background for this case, one can go back to beginnings of 2007, 
when the US’s “interference in the internal affairs of Latvia” started to meet 
increasing criticism in certain media outlets. In fact, the structural openness, which 
appeared in the mass media during the run-up to the Iraq conflict, was partially 
reversed. This time, the Independent Morning Newspaper (with rather unclear 
political affiliations) emerged as the main critic of the US’s activities in the field of 
democracy and anti-corruption efforts. Its discourse could be best characterized 
as “modern”; notably, it did not contest the positive role of the US in guaranteeing 
Latvia’s external security, but securitized its role in domestic politics. The US, 
and certain groups in Latvia which were seemingly affiliated with the United 
States, were represented as the threat to national sovereignty “from within.” The 
newspaper referred to alleged pressure by the US Embassy in order to guarantee 
that key posts in the state governance were taken by loyal candidates (e.g. Barisa 
2007, Rozenbergs and Dreiblats 2007a). Notably, at that period the critics of the US 
were most vocal, while supporters were not so noticeable. 
Coming back to the Ambassador’s speech, it must be noted that the ruling elite 
had also changed in the period since 2003. One of the political forces which was 
already present during the period covered by the second case study, the Latvian 
First Party – Latvian Way, strengthened its positions and was able to voice more 
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openly “postmodern(-ized)” views. Meanwhile, the most vocal “modernist” force, 
the New Era (which was generally pro-American), in 2007 went into opposition. 
The position of the ruling elite was also affected by growing domestic criticism, 
on the other hand (the government actually collapsed soon after this case). In this 
complicated domestic situation, it is all the more interesting to observe the debate 
on the relations with the United States. 
In this case, the governing elite at first tried to minimize the importance of the 
event (again – depolitization), by continuing to attempt to preserve good relations 
with the US but also not giving way to domestic political opponents. The only 
comment coming from the government before the event was that by the Foreign 
Minister, Artis Pabriks, saying that the speech is merely academic and implies no 
consequences for the Latvian-American partnership (see Sloga and Egle, 2007). 
Similarly, the president, Valdis Zatlers, asserted that the speech was academic, 
and also that Latvian domestic political problems should be solved by Latvians 
themselves (Ūdris 2007). After the speech, no visible changes took place. The 
Prime Minister continued to diminish the importance of the event, at the same 
time refuting some criticisms of the Ambassador and stating that the US remained 
Latvia’s “strategic partner” (Latvijas Avīze 2007). Both the President and the 
Foreign Minister also referred to the “strategic partnership” and to the “shared 
values” (Apollo/LETA 2007, Latvian MFA 2007, Zatlers 2007, Zagorovskaya 2007). 
Some disapproval of US behavior was manifested, but rather cautiously. (It was 
much more pronounced on the part of those coalition politicians who did not 
hold high political posts (Margēviča 2007, Rozenbergs and Dreiblats 2007b).) Still, 
a certain dualization of the official discourse appeared in this case, whereby the 
US was considered as, clearly, the guarantor of Latvia’s external security, but as 
a potential threat to its internal sovereignty. Pressure on the part of pro-American 
postmodern(-ized) and modern forces evidently contributed to the recognition of 
the first, external role. 
So what happened in the broader political debate and in the society? Some 
players, notably from the then-opposition “modernist” New Era party, supported 
the “common values” which were put forward in the speech (thus admitting that 
the US was, to some extent, guaranteeing Latvia’s internal security defined as 
its political integrity), while also referring to the US as the guarantor of Latvia’s 
security in the international arena. Other actors explicitly referred to the Russian 
threat, stating, in this context, that Latvia should do everything to preserve the 
trust of its main ally (e. g. Ozoliņš 2007). Thus, the “hard security” arguments, 
which seemed not to have had direct relevance to the particular case, were put to 
the forefront. At the same time, the Independent Morning Newspaper and some 
other media continued to uphold their critical stance. Some representatives of the 
“postmodern(-ized)” wing – even those who would not traditionally be considered 
pro-American – this time securitized the negative developments in Latvia and 
expressed full support to the US position. One of them explicitly noted that Todd-
Bailey’s speech was a friendly gesture, in contrast to the US policy with regard 
to Iraq (Delfi 2007, Ves.lv 2007). Yet others continued to advocate full neutrality, 
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arguing that Latvia should solve all of its problems – both domestic and external 
ones – on its own. So, while being very complicated, this case shows how the basic 
arguments regarding the US were preserved since the 1990s and were employed, 
in principle, regardless of the situation. This case also shows how the official elite 
evaded a broader discussion on the role of the US in Latvian security. The well-
known “strategic partner” argument has, in this and in other cases, served to 
cover the wider and more complicated reality and also more painful issues in 
the Latvian-US relations. Depolitization, along with securitization of Latvia’s 
international situation, has been a marked tendency.
CONCLUSIONS 
Latvian-American relations indeed offer an interesting empirical ground for 
researching discursive plurality and interactions among different norms. Even if, 
on the surface, the link between the two countries is an unproblematic “strategic 
partnership,” more complex dynamics have actually been in place. This article 
also shows the importance of civic engagement/policy debates and the negative 
consequences which can be left if structural limitations are in place. 
The first case study – discussions on the US-Baltic Charter in 1997–1998 – 
shows the predominance of the “modern” discourse in Latvia’s policy towards 
the US, which at that period remained virtually uncontested. However, contrary 
to the usual interpretations, the argument this article puts forward is that the 
lack of contestation was caused not only, and probably not so much, by domes-
tic consensus so much as by the unwillingness of decision-makers to engage in 
discussions with other actors. The decisions were made by the executive, with-
out even consulting the national Parliament, and definitely without consult-
ing with society as a whole. This lack of openness was reinforced by structur-
al obstacles, such as the overall atmosphere of secrecy (inhibiting independent 
media coverage) and a lack of proactive interest from the broader society. As 
a result, in the predominant discourse throughout this period, the US appeared as 
the main supporter of Latvia’s “traditional” security, independence, and Western 
orientation. At the same time, such “postmodern” concerns as economic coopera-
tion – being also part of the Charter – attracted almost no attention, despite be-
ing potentially important. Admittedly, the Charter became a target of somewhat 
stronger criticism in 1998, when Latvian policymakers discussed possible coop-
eration with the US in Iraq. To some extent, this marked the course of the heated 
discussions in later years. The Latvian political elites dominated the discursive 
space; their discourse was fairly congruent with that of the United States, but even 
more focused on Latvian sovereignty and “national interests” – meaning they 
have, at least partly, exercised their independent actorness.
The next case study shows the increased readiness, and interest, of the 
broader Latvian society to engage in discussions and to debate on the desired 
role of the US in Latvia’s foreign policy. This enthusiasm, however, found no 
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support on the decision-makers’ side. In 2002, when Latvia was expecting an 
invitation to join the EU and NATO, the elite still harbored strong feelings of 
insecurity and a strong “modernist” view of international affairs (either by 
intent, inertia, external pressure, or combination of these). In the broader Latvian 
society, a wide proliferation of alternative discourses was observable, for which 
no single source could be identified. Sometimes these were evidently related to 
broader discourses coming from outside Latvia’s borders and sometimes were 
of local origin, either historically determined (discursive structure is primary) 
or instrumentally created (actorness is primary). The role of the US in Latvia’s 
security was variously defined and hotly contested, sometimes interpreting it as a 
threat, sometimes as a protector, and taking into account very different spheres of 
life (including the economics and interests of individual Latvian citizens). Some 
of the arguments were even unrelated to Latvia, prioritizing human rights and 
international norms as the general values of the international community. At 
the same time, the decision-makers wholeheartedly adhered to the “with us or 
against us” logic of the American administration. The Latvian National Security 
Council, the Bush Administration and, importantly, the President declared their 
support for military intervention even before the decision of the UN. If anything, 
Latvia’s official support for the US policy only grew stronger with time, despite 
increasing protests from the broader society. The importance of public opinion 
was even derided by the president. The basic explanation was the need to be 
“with” the strategic partner, the US (and not the “postmodern” terrorist threat on 
which the US seemingly focused). The still-acute feelings of insecurity, together 
with the wish to strengthen their own positions within society, precluded elites 
from taking into account opposing domestic and international views. 
The final case study is somewhat different from the previous two, in that it 
refers to a different sphere on the agenda of Latvian-American relations, and also 
because of the different domestic situation at that moment. The elite itself had 
changed, and “postmodernized” forces were in power. Nevertheless, its reaction 
was actually very much based on the classical “modern” arguments, in that the 
US was still officially positioned as, first of all, the guarantor of Latvia’s military 
security. At that moment, the government was about to fall, while the “modern” 
opposition and some representatives of the broader society strongly supported the 
Ambassador’s message. It was evidently easier to relegate cooperation with the US 
into the “traditional” security domain, which had been already institutionalized 
during the previous years to a great intent, and not to explore the potential of 
relations in all spheres, including the economy, civil society, and transatlantic 
relations. At the same time, the US in this particular case was also pictured as 
a “postmodern” threat to Latvia’s political values and political independence. The 
criticism of corruption was actually interpreted as intervention into the internal 
affairs of the state. This rhetoric showed greater self-assurance of the “postmodern” 
elite after joining the EU and NATO, in that it dared to publicly disapprove of the 
speech. So, in this case, the elites’ discourse was to a great extent instrumental 
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(actor-determined), with the aim of ensuring their own political survival. During 
the period of the case study, it partly changed (becoming milder and more 
deferential to the US’s positive role in Latvia’s security) through interaction with 
alternative streams. Still, although public opinion was not altogether ignored in 
this case, the general trend of the elite not being ready to engage in true dialogue 
on security issues was observable. The third case showed that, as the Latvian-
American partnership extended deeper into those fields where domestic interests 
were stronger, it could find new supporters but also new opponents. Personalities, 
international trends, and other external factors evidently played a role in all cases, 
but the broader discursive trends, along with the tendency towards depolitization, 
have persisted.
Recent developments seem to confirm that the trends exhibited here have, to an 
extent, persisted to this day. The agenda of Latvian-American relations has become 
broader over the years, but Latvian policymakers are still reluctant to address 
situations which threaten “national interests” as defined by them – or perhaps 
their own narrow interests. Discursive interactions have already brought positive 
changes, by making the agenda of the political relations more comprehensive. In 
particular, the “strategic partnership” is being slowly expanded into the economic 
realm. However, broader involvement of the public is necessary – it would most 
likely even propel broader cooperation with the US and also legitimize it. 
By way of epilogue – a full-fledged analysis of occurrences in other Central 
and Eastern European states of course lies beyond the scope of this article, but 
there are indications that parallels could be found also in other cases. For instance, 
Maria Mälksoo finds significant discursive similarities among the Baltic States and 
Poland (Mälksoo 2010, also Mälksoo in Berg and Ehin 2009). As known, the Iraq 
issue has been hotly contested across the region, while the elites chose a similar, 
supportive course (e.g. Fakiolas and Fakiolas, 2006). Additionally, later, while 
some Central and East European leaders expressed a deeply securitized outlook, 
lamenting Obama’s withdrawal from Europe and the “reset” policy in the face of 
Russian aggressiveness (Adamkus et al. 2009), others continued to develop very 
pragmatic, low-key cooperation. The general tendency to disregard the role of 
civic participation and discussions with opponents, to prioritize narrow “national 
interests” over international partners’ opinions and requests, and to use the same 
“national interests” as the universal explanation of any policies is likely to be a 
part of the Soviet legacy – and one can presume that leaders holding on to their 
power still prefer this political culture. In any case, it is surely not characteristic of 
Latvia alone. To sum up, the underlying substances of the region states’ “strategic 
partnerships” with the US are worthy of exploring. 
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3 Securitizing the Roma of Hungary
Tamás Csiki
INTRODUCTION
The intensifying right-wing extremism – through popular movements, political 
parties, and paramilitary organizations – seen in Central Europe has been subject 
to a great deal of increased scrutiny in recent years (Abbas et al. 2011, Langenbacher 
and Schellenberg 2011, Schiedel 2011, Goodwin et al. 2012, Mammone et al. 2012, 
Mareš 2012, Melzer and Serafin 2013). Within this wider framework of analysis, 
which also includes the examination of nationalist, populist, anti-Semitic, and 
anti-immigration elements, extremist anti-Roma tendencies and practices in 
Central Europe have also become more and more studied. However, comparative 
studies in a systematic manner that could locate and identify such practices, 
and also explain the logic of similar events and tendencies in Central European 
countries, are still sorely missing. Some analyses have already highlighted 
repeated cases of violence1 and examples of attempts at securitizing the relations 
of Roma (minority) and non-Roma (majority) communities (Political Capital 2010: 
56–61, ERRC 2012a, Bodnárová and Vicenová 2013).
A similar escalation of tensions as seen in Hungary in 2008–2010 is possible 
in other countries of the region, where significant numbers of Roma live as 
a marginalized, poorly integrated minority of society. Just to give one example, 
the demonstration in Šarišské Michaľany, Slovakia, in August 2009 was one of the 
biggest meetings of extreme right-wing Slovak associations in recent years. It was 
triggered by the perception of critically strained relations between the majority 
population and the Roma minority, framed as such by Slovak Brotherhood 
(Slovenská Pospolitosť, SP), an association whose leaders announced the creation 
of a new far-right party, called The People’s Party – Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana – 
Naše Slovensko, ĽSNS) shortly thereafter. As Bodnárová and Vicenová point 
out, “Šarišské Michaľany thus became the first stop in a series of pre-election 
demonstrations directed against the Roma minority, which SP together with ĽSNS 
organized since the summer 2009 all the way up to the parliamentary elections 
in 2010” (Bodnárová and Vicenová 2013: 24). It is clear that these actions were 
part of the quest for political support behind the new extremist political actors, 
exploiting perceived and newly constructed societal tensions.
Such parallel dynamics of ethnic entrepreneurship and conscious attempts to 
draw on a security discourse and appear as securitizing actors may be identifiable 
1 Since 2008, the European Roma Rights Center has registered at least 48 violent attacks against 
Roma in Hungary, 40 attacks in the Czech Republic, and 13 attacks in Slovakia resulting in a combined 
total of at least 11 fatalities. Between September 2011 and July 2012, 14 attacks against Roma and their 
property had been registered in Bulgaria (ERRC 2012b).
34
in other countries as well. In such countries, an “enabling environment” would 
also be discernible, as societal tensions among Roma and non-Roma are perceived 
and articulated in a radically othering manner. Therefore, conducting further 
national and comparative research is necessary and would assist scholars in 
identifying the ways securitizing actors pursue their agenda. This in turn would 
make it easier to prevent the successful securitization of issues related to the 
Roma population of Central Europe.
The constructivist theory of securitization is a long-established one and it has 
been applied to explaining the success of Western European anti-immigration 
movements in the 1990s (Huysmans 1995), as well as the dynamics of securitization 
of ethnic relations in Transylvania in 1990 (Roe 2002, Roe 2004). As a pioneer 
attempt, the current paper will apply this approach to securitization attempts by 
radical and extreme right-wing actors targeting the Roma in Hungary between 
2006 and 2010.
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Broadly speaking, the paper builds on the well-known concept of securitization 
that emerged from constructivist thought in international relations throughout 
the 1990s (Wæver 1993, 1995). Accordingly, securitization is understood as an 
extreme version of politicization that “upgrades” an issue from the level of social 
and political discourse to the level of security discourse. This means identifying 
an existential threat that demands urgent and immediate attention, as well as 
the use of extraordinary measures to counter this threat (Buzan et al 1998: 24–25; 
Wæver 1995: 51). As non-conventional, non-military threats – such as threats to 
societal security – are more difficult to quantify and justify as truly existential, 
more explanation is needed regarding how extremist actors can abuse securitizing 
discourse for such argumentation.2
Specifically speaking about the methodology of the paper, securitization, 
as a process-oriented conception of security, examines how a certain issue 
is transformed into a matter of security. As an inter-subjective and socially 
constructed process it aims to understand “who securitizes, on what issues 
(threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under 
2 The most fundamental need of any society is security – whether it is defined as an ability 
to prevent, deter or avert threats and protect against them, or as a set of favorable circumstances 
that implies no perceivable threats at all. Usually it is the most powerful actor – the state (central 
government) – that initiates securitization regarding a potential threat to national security (national 
sovereignty, territory, citizens etc.). In classical cases, clearly definable, quantifiable (usually military) 
threats are identified as threats against which the state needs to act. But beyond the objective criteria 
of security – such as the number of armed forces – it is the subjective perception of security (lack or 
presence of fear or insecurity) that determines the level of security that characterizes a society and the 
focus on new challenges to security, for example, how international terrorism became a top priority 
in the security policies of most European countries after 2001. Originally, this dualism was pointed 
out by Arnold Wolfers, who defined “security” by noting that “in any objective sense, measures the 
absence of threats to acquire values; in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be 
attacked” (Wolfers 1962: 150).
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what conditions” (Buzan et al 1998: 32). When examining the political practices of 
domestic extremism, Manuel Mireanu makes the following argument: “Extremist 
groups use a mechanism of security to gain legitimacy for their actions. Leading 
members of political extremist groups articulate speech acts that speak on behalf 
of the society, attempt to securitize threats taken from the social imaginary 
and then propose urgent measures to tackle these threats” (Mireanu 2012: 43).
Therefore, in the following subchapters I will use process tracing to map how 
Hungarian radical and extremist right-wing actors carried out a securitization 
attempt of Hungarian Roma population in the years 2006–2010. The peak of the 
process was – just like in case of the previously mentioned Slovak case – in the 
run-up period to the 2009 European and 2010 national parliamentary elections, 
escalating into a series of threat marches (2007–2010) and acts of physical violence 
against Roma residents (2008–2010).
The conceptual framework of the paper will go beyond the traditional 
interpretation and use of the Copenhagen model of securitization in several 
aspects. First, in accordance with the critical remarks of Thierry Balzacq related 
to securitization, I argue that a speech act view of security does not provide 
adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in “real situations” 
(Balzacq 2005:171). Throughout the paper I view and examine securitization 
as a pragmatic process, including the context and the features of the audience, as 
well as the relations of the parties concerned (Balzacq 2011: 52–53). Therefore in 
a novel approach, process tracing will be applied and two new conceptual 
elements will be introduced: trigger events and securitization moves, which 
brought the process forward and elevated discourse to increasingly securitized 
levels. Within this broader framework, the securitizing discourse (speech act) will 
be only one of the factors that I examine (See Figure 2). Second, securitization as 
a discursive practice will be explained by using the concept of “radical othering” 
as put forward by Lene Hansen in order to highlight the logic of right-wing 
extremists who constructed a “negative pole”, an image of an adversary (Roma) 
to the majority population (Hungarians) (Hansen, 1997:370). This goes beyond 
traditional speech act analysis, because the underlying sentiments and prejudices, 
and the negative image of Roma strongly present in Hungarian societal thought, 
also need to be studied. Third, securitization as a political practice and tool of the 
radical right will be studied in order to understand the motives of securitization – 
thus the question of political entrepreneurship will be briefly addressed in order 
to give a realistic explanation of events.
As I mentioned, when analyzing the securitization process, three trigger 
events (at the locations of Olaszliszka, Veszprém, and Sajóbábony) and three 
securitization moves (the discourse on “Roma criminality,” threat marches by 
the Magyar Gárda, and a series of physical attacks against Roma) are identified. 
I argue that through this process, the normally politicized issues of public safety 
and crime, occasionally accompanied with active scapegoating and blaming in 
education and social welfare controversies, were used in a securitizing discourse. 
This also means an atypical approach to securitization where I do not point to one 
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single event or one specific speech act that identifies (constructs) the securitized 
threat. What follows is a process-oriented explanation that gives a great deal of 
space to examining the context in which securitization took place, what methods 
and means the securitizing actor applied, and why the audience was receptive to 
the securitization attempt.
In a 2008 article, Matt McDonald also criticized the traditional securitization 
framework for being problematically narrow in three senses. First, the form of act 
that constructs security is defined (too) narrowly, with the focus on the speech of 
dominant actors. Second, the context of the act is defined (too) narrowly, with the 
focus only on the moment of intervention. Finally, the framework of securitization 
is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the 
designation of threats (McDonald 2008: 563). Therefore I will be identifying trigger 
events that escalated the process to a higher level and securitization moves that kept 
moving the process forward (Figure 1).
Figure 1: The theoretical schematic of process tracing for the securitization of Roma in 
Hungary leading up to the successful securitizing speech act (2006–2009)
This methodological approach offers an answer to previous critiques to the 
practical application of securitization theory by building on the sociological 
approach of Thierry Balzacq. As a corrective, he put forward three basic 
assumptions: (i) that effective securitization is audience-centered; (ii) that secu- 
ritization is context-dependent; and (iii) that an effective securitization is 
power-laden (Balzacq 2011: 31–53). The issue of audience will be addressed in 
the following subchapter, when the negative attitudes and prevalent strong anti-
Roma sentiments attributed to majority Hungarian society will be described. The 
context of securitization will be mapped through process tracing in the period 
2006–2010 shown by Figure 1. Additionally, the “effective securitization move” 
hereby defined as a “successful securitizing speech act” – identified not only as 
the result of the process described but as a distinctive element, indeed as a speech 
act of justification – also needs further explanation.
The Copenhagen School stipulated that a securitizing move in itself does 
not constitute a successful securitization attempt. For the securitizing move to 
be successful, it must be accepted by the audience, which is demonstrated by the 
demand for state (government) action. The paper identifies a statement by the 
former Mayor of Miskolc, Sándor Káli (a member of the Socialist Party, which also 
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was the main party of government at the national level) on November 16, 2009 
as the speech act that proved the successful securitization of “the Roma issue.” 
At that time, he commented on a violent clash between Roma and non-Roma 
residents in Sajóbábony a day earlier as “Wake up Hungary! It is high time to 
realize that if things go on like this, we will be preparing for more severe clashes 
and circumstances of civil war, not for elections” (Origo 2009). I identify this step 
as a “successful securitizing speech act”3 as the head of the local government 
authority who was inherently tasked to avoid securitization and to prevent 
societal conflict, openly admitted that tensions were to surpass a level where state 
action would become necessary to avoid the escalation of violence.
This specific case is identified as the “successful securitizing speech act” within 
the wider framework of the securitization process, as the commentary came from 
the political left, evaluating it as an element of the ongoing highly charged political 
discourse and thus justifying the existence of a securitized discourse. Taken as 
such, it also satisfies the criteria that Wæver identified for a successful speech act: 
it was delivered by an authentic, authorized representative of the then governing 
Socialist Party, the occasion was significant as the violent clash on the previous day, 
Káli’s statement received heightened attention in Hungary and it was repeatedly 
cited in national media. Moreover, Káli’s statement generated significant response 
on behalf of the society and the political elite as well (Figure 2).
Figure 2: The elements of the process that led to a successful securitization of Roma in 
Hungary (2006–2010)
From the analytical perspective, there is one more element of the process that 
needs to be carefully described: this is the pattern of “radical othering.” This 
creates the connective tissue among societal phenomena (public resentment, 
negative public perceptions, and attitudes towards Roma) and political action 
(upgrading political discourse on public safety and economic concerns, and 
linking these to Roma through scapegoating, blaming, and othering) by radical- 
and extreme-right securitizing actors. As Lene Hansen defines it, “radical 
othering” is the discursive process of identification through which the image 
3 The “speech act,” as defined by Wæver (1989), is the specific element of discourse which clearly 
identifies a threat to society. The success of any such speech act depends on many factors, for example 
on who (an authentic, authorized actor), among what circumstances (on a significant occasion), at what 
level (national media) it is delivered, and what response it generates in society and among political elites.
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of a negative pole is constructed against one’s self-identification4 (Hansen, 1997: 
370). Thus, an image of an “enemy” that bears negative characteristics and poses 
a clearly defined threat to “us” is constructed. In relation to the Hungarian case, 
it is the constructed image of “the Roma” that had been framed by radical and 
extreme right-wing actors.5 This image depicts Roma people within an ethnicizing 
groupist discourse through blaming and hate speech as “parasites, a burden to 
society, criminals” etc. Such construction of the “threat” identified by the radical 
and extreme right would “justify a need to act to discipline the Roma,” as some 
of them argued. The constructed, racist nature of this discourse clearly builds 
on the public perceptions of “Roma otherness” and prevailing negative attitudes 
towards “the Roma” documented in recent years’ empirical research, as will be 
explained later on (Csepeli et al 1998, Tárki 2006, Publicus Research 2009, Bernát 
2010, Bernáth and Messing 2011, Bernát et al 2012).
The most significant limitation to the process tracing analytical framework 
introduced above is the extensive media and political discourse analysis that 
is needed to precisely underpin these claims and argumentation. Given the 
relatively long time period (four years), the high number of incidents (ranging from 
education and social controversies that had been ethnicized to threat marches 
and physical violence targeting Roma people) requires either the analysis of 
thousands of media records or selectivity within this potential pool of discourse 
elements. The varying focus of these events under scrutiny oscillates between 
local significance and national visibility, thus suggesting the need for judicious 
selectivity. In addition, the radical nationalist Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom 
party and extremist groups have less access to mainstream media; therefore, they 
have developed their own (mainly online) media channels (such as the openly 
racist kuruc.info and barikad.hu), in addition to using political statements. Access 
to archived information on these sites is limited.
4 In a 1997 article – later widely applied in analytical case studies – Lene Hansen studied the 
ways and methods of how security identity is developed and how threats are defined by the state 
according to poststructuralist schools of security studies (like the Copenhagen School). She builds on 
the dyadic approach of differentiating between Self and Other, presenting three levels of the Other: 
the ontological level (the perception of the Other’s being in relation to the Self along the Self/Other 
dichotomy); the axiological level (a valuation of the Other in terms of moral status and “affection” 
as being inferior, equal, or superior to Us); and the praxeological level (the practical policy towards 
the Other: modifying the Other (assimilation, enslavement, extermination), modifying oneself to the 
Other (active neutrality, deliberate indifference) or submission to the Other (self-assimilation). Based 
on this concept, Hansen defines the “radical Other” as one attributed a high degree of difference from 
Self, as associated with securitized or highly politicized attributes, as an existential threat, and as 
a threat to security. This concept serves as one of the theoretical centerpieces of the article, identifying 
how “the Roma” have been identified as such a “radical Other” by radical and extreme right-wing 
actors in Hungary (Hansen 1997: 369–397).
5 As political and social science research focusing on Roma is not only academically complex but 
also politically sensitive, we need to keep in mind that there are a number of controversial conceptual 
and ideational issues also playing important roles in the current analysis, such as the use of terminology 
like the “Roma issue” and “Roma crime” when bringing up political, media, or public discourse. Being 
aware of the fact that the act of naming the elements of discourse itself pre-determines many things, 
it is important to note here that these expressions are used in a solely analytical manner, referring to 
elements of discourse, and the author does not subscribe to using these in any other context or wishes 
to provide legitimacy for these expressions.
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Last but not least, it is important to emphasize that identifying and analyzing 
the securitization process is not the end of the story, but in this specific case, the 
central government’s response and desecuritization attempts also need to be briefly 
summarized. These, beginning in 2009, prevented further escalation and a fully 
successful securitization attempt. However, we need to keep in mind that given the 
prevailing tension in Hungarian society, the desecuritization process is (will be) 
a complex one and its in-depth analysis would go beyond the current analysis.
THE SECURITIZATION ATTEMPT TARGETING THE ROMA IN HUNGARY, 2006–2010
Acts of violence targeting Roma individuals in 2008–2010 raised public sympathy 
to an ethnicizing/racist political discourse for the benefit of radical right-wing 
politicians and extreme right-wing actors in Hungary who attempted to construct 
a “Roma issue” through political discourse and presenting it as a threat to society-
wide security. This occurred during a period of transformation of the radical 
and extremist political right that had begun around 2002 and became apparent 
in 2006, gradually consolidating the position of the radical nationalist political 
party Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (hereafter “Jobbik”) in national politics. 
Gaining momentum from the violent events that were associated with the anti-
government demonstrations of October 2006, right-wing individuals and groups 
used the window of opportunity opened up by widespread societal resentment 
to enhance their political capital before the 2009 European and the 2010 national 
parliamentary elections.
Radical and extremist right-wing actors successfully exploited the prevalent strong 
anti-Roma attitudes of Hungarian society and the negative public perceptions of the 
Roma6 to generate political capital, building on concerns about crime, public safety, 
and economic stagnation. These were presented through increased scapegoating and 
radical othering, characterizing “Roma otherness” – used here as an analytical term 
– as a key motif of radical right discourse. In this discourse, a parallel was drawn 
between high crime rates, the public’s strong desire to enhance public safety, and the 
settlement patterns of Roma people, calling for the government to take “necessary 
measures to protect the Hungarian people,” primarily in underdeveloped rural 
regions. Terms such as “Gypsy crime” and “Roma criminality” that had already been 
brought up before reappeared as a key feature of the “Roma issue.”7 Societal discourse 
went even beyond that, as a significant proportion of Hungarian society has long had 
an abstract image of “the Roma” in mind that is “poor, uneducated, unemployed, 
disproportionately relying on social benefits, [and] more likely to commit criminal 
6 Unlike anti-Semitism, anti-Roma attitudes are openly declared, majoritarian characteristics of 
Hungarian society that are not restricted to the (radical and extreme) right-wing and are primarily 
strong in rural areas (Political Capital 2008: 22),
7 Despite the fact that terms like “Gypsy crime” and “Roma criminality” have been duly discredited 
in academia for reasons of discriminatory ethnic profiling, these have remained parts of public and 
political discourse.
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offenses”8 and as being both a burden and a threat to society (Bernát 2010, Társadalmi 
Konfliktusok Kutatóközpont 2011).
Recalling the argument of Manuel Mireanu, extremist groups use the 
mechanism of security to gain legitimacy for their actions. Speaking on behalf of 
the society, they articulate a constructed divide between certain groups within 
society that are vulnerable and threatened by other groups, and volunteer to take 
actions against these threats. This not only means that through radical othering, 
society becomes divided between “us” and “them” along lines of extremist 
ideologies, but also means that these groups challenge the monopoly of violence 
of the state (Mireanu 2012: 43–44).
Political extremism can thus be seen as providing security to a community that 
feels threatened and that demands security; extremist actions are the exceptional 
part of an existential discourse based on social fears. These groups are there to 
“rescue” society from a common enemy, against which the state is either helpless, 
or in complicity with (Mireanu 2012: 45).
Existing and perceived problems brought up by Jobbik were to set the scene for 
securitizing the Roma population of Hungary “from whom majority society should 
be protected.” As a result, between 2007 and 2010 – escalating in 2009 before the 2010 
national elections and showing a rapidly declining trend afterwards – threat marches 
and intimidation from extreme right-wing organizations and individuals targeted 
rural neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were populated predominantly by poor, 
segregated people, identified by the local population as Roma.
When analyzing the process of securitization, three trigger events (at Olaszliszka, 
Veszprém, and Sajóbábony) and three securitization moves (the discourse on “Roma 
criminality”, threat marches by the Magyar Gárda, and a series of physical attacks 
against Roma) have been identified. Trigger events escalated the process to a higher 
level, while securitization moves kept pushing the process forward (Figure 3).
Figure 3: The process of securitizing the Roma of Hungary, 2006–2009
8 An earlier study specified “welfare chauvinism” as the link between the perception of poor Roma 
households as recipients of social benefits and the inclination to discriminate them by other social groups 
competing for financial resources. When economic conditions deteriorate, such competition becomes 
harsher – such as since 2008, when economic and financial crisis hit Hungary. (See Székelyi et al. 2001: 19-
46.)
Trigger events
Securitization 
moves
Olaszliska
(2006)
Olaszliska
(2006)
Physical violence
(2008–2009)
Veszprém
(2009)
Sajóbábony
(2009)
Roma
criminality
discourse
(2006–)
Successful
securitizing
speech act 
Miskolc (2009)
40
The events of October 15, 2006 in Olaszliszka (Northeastern Hungary) marked 
a decisive point in consolidating anti-Roma discourse. A local teacher, Lajos Szögi, 
accidentally slightly hit a young Roma girl by car in a road accident and when he 
stopped his car and got out to check upon her, he was beaten to death by a group 
of Roma individuals (relatives and fellow residents) taking revenge on the scene. 
The violent incident was presented by radical right-wing actors as an evidence of 
“an inherent, ethnicized conflict between Hungarians and Roma/Gypsies” that 
“exemplifies the threat that people can expect to face anytime, anywhere” (Kuruc.
info 2006a, 2006b). The brutal nature of the incident and the way it was presented in 
national mass media was consciously used by Jobbik and related organizations in the 
coming months to present themselves as supporters of society’s claim that further 
measures had to be taken to ensure security and to maintain public safety and order – 
far beyond the measures taken by public authorities and the police (Kuruc.info 2006c).
On this occasion “Roma criminality/Gypsy crime” became an everyday motif 
of radical and extreme right-wing media discourse (Kuruc.info 2006d).9 Though the 
term itself had appeared in Hungarian media before, previously it was rejected as 
being discredited for racial bias, reflecting the established European practice that no 
information on the physical, ethnic etc. characteristics of perpetrators can be recorded 
by police authorities. However, practice is not so simple if we take one – exceptional 
– example. In an interview on January 30, 2009, the Chief of Police of Miskolc, Albert 
Pásztor, spoke about local crime patterns and when speaking about robbery cases 
he included that “such petty crime as robbery in the street has recently been carried 
out here only by gypsies; a Hungarian would try to rob a financial institution or gas 
station, but street robberies are only committed by gypsies” (Index 2009a). He was 
talking about local crime along ethnic terms, adding that“ it is time to speak out 
frankly and openly so that we can find a solution to this problem, ”generating vigorous 
debate among local and central authorities, the police, Roma authorities, NGOs, 
and the general population. Both in an official statement in February 2009 and in 
a personal interview in August 2012 Mr. Pásztor emphasized that he had no racist 
intentions and he was looking for solutions, rather than generating new problems 
(HVG 2009). The overwhelming support behind him (uniting left and right wing, 
Roma and non-Roma representatives in this respect) demonstrated that it was 
indeed media (both mainstream and extreme right) that used this occasion to boost 
discourse on “Roma criminality” making it the second securitization move in the 
process tracing.
9 Jobbik’s discourse began focusing on public order and “Roma criminality” from 2006 on, 
building on the public’s ever stronger desire for order and stability – especially after the October 2006 
government crisis and widespread protests. In doing so, the party and its related associations were 
rather successful in creating their own alternative media (see Political Capital 2008: 67–71, Political 
Capital 2009: 67–69, Bíró Nagy 2012: 10–12.). The hesitant attitude of Hungarian parliamentary parties 
from addressing issues of societal and economic concern created a window of opportunity for Jobbik 
to identify and openly speak out for an agenda that resonated with the majority society. It is important 
to see that this constructed discourse reduced rural public safety concerns to a criminological problem 
involving Roma, and acts of crime being often referred to as “Roma criminality.” This resulted in 
an oversimplifying discourse full of false assumptions discursively equaling “Roma” and “criminal” 
(Political Capital 2009: 67).
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Only a few days later (February 8), the murder of handball player Marian 
Cozma of the Hungarian club MKB Veszprém with whom two other players had 
also been seriously injured became the next trigger event to greatly influence anti-
Roma public discourse. The three players got involved in a club fight in Veszprém 
and had been attacked then stabbed by local perpetrators (Index 2009b). The 
violent attack was highlighted in many national media from the beginning in 
ethnicized terms, often identifying the suspects as “Roma criminals.” They 
were indeed of Roma background and when safety camera footage was released 
popular anti-Roma resentment flared up.
Public safety has been people’s top concern for years, and extreme right-wing 
actors were ready to address this concern (Radványi, 2009). Studies have pointed 
out that the establishment of local Jobbik party organizations and Magyar 
Gárda organizations, as well as the launching of a series of threat marches in 
neighborhoods perceived as predominantly inhabited by Roma were well-
coordinated, serving the purpose of raising public awareness and gaining political 
support, especially in rural regions (Political Capital 2008: 79, Political Capital 
2009: 69–70). The undemocratic anti-Roma elements of the discourse promoted by 
Jobbik and related associations calling for an “alternative solution”(particularly 
in light of the inability of governing parties at the time to address the “problem”) 
was reinforced by the establishment of the paramilitary Magyar Gárda. 
(Recalling Mireanu’s argument, such groups offer “protection” to a community 
that feels threatened and that demands security by challenging the monopoly of 
violence of the state (Mireanu: 2012 44–45). The foundation of the Magyar Gárda 
expressed the willingness and readiness of radical and extreme right-wing actors 
to intervene where they perceived that the state was not adequately providing 
for public safety. By conducting demonstrative marches in crime-stricken rural 
neighborhoods – that also happened to be Roma neighborhoods – since 2007, 
these groups staged a tangible alternative solution that Jobbik offered for the 
problems that society perceived. This element of Jobbik’s discourse framed Roma 
– non-Roma relations along an offensive-defensive dimension in which Jobbik 
and the Magyar Gárda were depicted as protectors of the population from an 
aggressive, dangerous, threatening “other” (“the Roma”) due to the inadequate 
presence and inactivity of public authorities. Some analysts have even called the 
Magyar Gárda“the symbol of anti-Roma sentiments” (Political Capital 2008: 60).
The series of demonstrative (threat) marches that had been organized by the Magyar 
Gárda and associated organizations (sometimes independently, other times related to 
political demonstrations of Jobbik) represent the second broad securitization move in 
the series of events. Major demonstrations were conducted in Szentes (November 8, 
2007), Tatárszentgyörgy (December 9, 2007), Nyírkáta (April 12, 2008), Vásárosnamény 
(April 27, 2008), Pátka (June 13, 2008), Sarkad (March 1, 2009), etc. The demonstrative 
aim of these was “to present an alternative to the inadequate police presence in rural 
areas” and “to prevent criminal offenses.” The marches either directly targeted 
neighborhoods where Roma families lived, or communicated anti-Roma messages 
identifying “Roma criminality” as the reason for organizing these marches.
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Demonstrative (threat, intimidation) marches had a very significant consequence: 
they gave the tensions physical reality, bringing them to the streets in several rural 
settlements and escalated them further along a Roma – non-Roma dimension.10 
During 2008–2009, the activities of radical and extreme right-wing organizations, 
including paramilitary groups, also became more coordinated. Meanwhile, 
beginning in 2008, a series of physical attacks targeted Roma individuals, thus the 
threat perception of the population – including both Roma and non-Roma – became 
more sensitive and alarmist. Between June 2008 and July 2010, twenty-one armed 
attacks directly targeted Roma individuals, families or property (Table 1).
10 These developments in radical- extreme-right activities came in a period when Hungarian 
society reported unprecedented levels of societal tension. Data from Eurobarometer 2009 show that 
Hungarian society suffered from the highest levels of societal tension among all 27 EU member 
Location Date Physical attack
Pátka June 3, 2008 Three Roma houses attacked by firebombs 
  (no injuries)
Galgagyörk* July 21, 2008 Shots fired at Roma houses (no injuries)
Piricse* August 8, 2008 Two Roma houses attacked by firebombs, a woman 
  shot in the leg while trying to escape
Nagycsécs* November 3, 2008 Two Roma houses attacked by firebombs, two men 
  trying to escape shot dead
Nyíradony- September 5, 2008 Shots fired at a Roma house (no injuries)
-Tamásipuszta*  
Siófok September 17, 2008 A hand grenade thrown into the yard of a Roma 
  house (no injuries)
Tarnabod* September 29, 2008 Four Roma houses attacked by firebombs and 
  gunshots (no injuries)
Debrecen November 4, 2008 A Roma house attacked by a firebomb (no injuries)
Pusztadobos November 20, 2008 A Roma house attacked by a firebomb (no injuries)
Alsózsolca* December 15, 2008 A Roma man shot and seriously wounded, another 
  slightly injured
Tatárszentgyörgy* February 23, 2009 A Roma house attacked by a firebomb, a man and 
  his son shot dead while trying to escape; two other 
  children wounded
Tatárszentgyörgy April 7, 2009 A Roma house attacked by a firebomb (no injuries)
Olt April 15, 2009 Shots fired at the house of a Roma family
Fadd April 13, 2009 Two Roma houses attacked by firebombs 
  (no injuries)
Tiszalök* April 22, 2009 A Roma man shot dead
Táska May 5, 2009 Shots fired at the house of a Roma family 
  (no injuries)
Kisléta* August 3, 2009 One Roma woman shot dead, her daughter 
  seriously injured
Sajóbábony November 14-15, 2009 Physical violence between small groups of local 
  Roma individuals and members of Magyar Gárda 
  carrying out “demonstrative patrols” in town
Siófok March 18, 2010 Three Roma houses damaged by firebombs 
  (no injuries)
Hatvan May 22, 2010 A Roma house damaged by firebombs (no injuries)
Olaszliszka July 4, 2010 Shots fired at a Roma House (no injuries)
*: Attacks committed by the “Gang of Four” – István Kiss, Árpád Kiss, István Csontos, Zsolt Pető
Table 1: Physical attacks involving the use of fire bombs or firearms targeting Roma 
individuals in Hungary, January 2008 – July 2011 (ERRC 2011)
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Among these attacks, nine proved to be serial attacks and killings, altogether 
ending in the murder of six people and seven more with firearms-related injuries; 
all of the victims were Roma. Based on the criminal trial involving the so-called 
“Gang of Four,” the attacks were motivated by anti-Roma sentiment and racist 
hatred (Magyar Nemzet Online 2013a, 2013b). These hate crimes (even though this 
legal qualification is not applied in Hungarian law) also received expansive media 
attention and the anti-Roma characteristic of the attacks was obvious, creating an 
atmosphere of mutual distrust, fear, and conflict in rural settlements where Roma 
and non-Roma people lived together. Therefore, the escalating physical violence 
represented the third securitization move within the process under investigation .
The escalation of tensions peaked at the end of 2009 with frequent demon-
strations of radical and extremist groups in small and middle-sized rural set-
tlements. Sometimes these also provoked furious reactions from local Roma 
residents. Even though only the extreme right-wing discourse had adopted 
a vision of “civil war” previously, the violent clash between local Roma residents 
and members of the Magyar Gárda marching in Sajóbábony on November 15, 
2009 signaled a new level, making it the third trigger event identified in this anal-
ysis (Index, 2009c).
The Sajóbábony incident by itself demonstrated an unprecedented level of 
apparent, open, and physically violent conflict on a local level. The reason why 
its importance went beyond this was that the incident led to the comment by 
the Mayor of Miskolc at the time, Sándor Káli, that “there was a need to prepare 
for circumstances of civil war” (Origo 2009). In a personal interview conducted 
with Mr. Káli in August 2012 he emphasized that his intention was to point out 
the momentary loss of control over the tense situation that enabled local actors to 
turn to violent means. He wanted to focus the attention of both the authorities and 
the local population to the need to avoid such incidents from happening again in 
order to prevent mutual confrontation and escalation.
This specific case is identified as the “successful securitizing speech act” 
within the wider framework of the securitization process. The fact that someone 
representing both “public authority” and (then-governing) “left-wing” side of 
the political spectrum subscribes to the securitizing discourse, as the Mayor of 
Miskolc11 (a region in which Roma – non-Roma tensions have been constantly 
high) did, clearly expresses that the securitizing discourse had taken roots not 
only in radical right-wing politics that time, but had received a response among 
the governing elite as well.12 Despite Káli’s intention, the national media took over 
countries along all four dimensions surveyed: between the majority and an ethnic minority (close to 
70% of respondents), among older and younger generations, and among the rich and the poor, as well 
as among employers and employees (Bernát 2010: 319–321).
11 The mayor was also at the same time a member of the National Assembly.
12 This claim might be disputed, but from the discourse analytical point of view, Káli was 
representing both, and his commentary cannot be assessed independent of the context as if it were 
his private opinion. Carrying a heavy symbolic charge by polarizing the context to such extremes as 
talking about civil war, which was nationally broadcast and carried by media, it had the potential to 
be identified as a “successful securitizing speech act” in accordance with securitization theory.
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this new element of the securitization discourse (see for example Népszabadság 
2009). However, there were some who were eager to voice that neither the 
terminology, nor – more importantly – the situation reflected the imminent threat 
of extensive societal conflict (Tálas 2009). These expert warnings can also be seen 
as the first steps towards a desecuritization process in which both central and 
local authorities would have to do their part.
It was only after the 2010 national elections and the implementation of various 
measures by the government measures that tensions began to ease. These 
included strengthening the police presence on the streets, with a strong emphasis 
on rural neighborhoods, as well as further efforts to tackle crime (including 
petty crimes) through initiating the Public Order and Safety Program (Rend 
és Biztonság Program) in 2009–2010 (Jogi Fórum 2009). The last major incident 
involving firearms took place in Olaszliszka on July 4, 2010, when shots were fired 
at a Roma house (causing no injuries), and in the coming months a gradual “de-
escalation” – desecuritization – followed.
THE KEY TO SECURITIZATION: SUCCESSFUL “RADICAL OTHERING”
Balzacq argued that effective securitization is audience-centered (Balzacq 
2005:171) and practice has shown that in the securitization process described 
above, the connection between the securitizing actor and the audience was 
constructed through “radical othering.” In other words, societal phenomena 
(public resentment, negative public perceptions and attitudes) was directly linked 
to the presence of Roma and transformed into political action (securitizing the 
discourse on public safety, economic concerns) through scapegoating, blaming, 
and othering. This section will give an explanation of why Hungarian society 
proved to be a very receptive audience to the securitization moves of the radical 
and extreme right through discourse.
As mentioned before, Lene Hansen defines “radical othering” as the discursive 
process of identification through which the image of a negative pole is constructed 
against one’s self-identification. Thus, an image of an “enemy” that bears negative 
characteristics and poses a clearly defined threat to “us” is constructed (Hansen, 
1997: 370). In relation to the Hungarian case it is the constructed image of “the 
Roma” that is significant for our purposes. This image depicts Roma people 
within an ethnicizing, groupist discourse through blaming and hate speech as 
“parasites, a burden to society, criminals,” etc. Such a construction of the “threat” 
builds on the public perceptions of “Roma otherness” and prevailing negative 
attitudes towards “the Roma” documented in recent years’ empirical research.13
13 The notion of “Roma” itself has prompted heated debate in academia recalling arguments from 
analytical fallacies of groupism to the politics of identification. As Rogers Brubaker argued against 
the use of essentializing conceptions during any analysis that refers to a community of people: “we 
should not uncritically adopt categories of ethnopolitical practice as our categories of social analysis” 
(Brubaker 2002: 166). This fallacy would lead to what Brubaker framed as “groupism: the tendency 
to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as 
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Thus the key to understanding radical-extreme-right securitization attempts 
targeting “the Roma” in recent years in Hungary is to explain what serves as the 
medium for anti-Roma sentiment that can be escalated or “upgraded” through 
radical othering. This medium is the long-existent negative public perception 
of “the Roma”14 in Hungary that is a prevailing image drawn through ethno-
historical stereotypes of Roma in Hungarian society that has repeatedly been 
studied. It is also important to note that studies as early as in the 1980s (and 
repeatedly during the 1990s) highlighted that Hungarian society in general is 
very much characterized by ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and welfare chauvinism, 
which all strengthen the disinclination towards the Roma population of Hungary 
(Fábián 1999, Székelyi et al. 2001, Csepeli 2002).
Despite the fact that systematic, comparable empirical research results have 
been fragmentary in the past two decades, those which are available have revealed 
the presence of strong anti-Roma sentiments, coupled with negative and also 
discriminatory attitudes towards the Roma population of Hungary specifically 
(Csepeli et al 1998, Tárki 2006, Publicus Research 2009, Bernát 2010, Bernáth and 
Messing 2011, Bernát et al. 2012). Furthermore, these negative attitudes have 
remained strong or further strengthened in most aspects if we compare the 1990s 
and the 2000s (Table 2).
Table 2: Attitudes towards the Roma in the 1990s and 2000s in Hungary (Bernát et al. 2012: 4)
basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social 
analysis” (Brubaker 2002: 164).Therefore, we need to keep in mind that the article refers to “Roma” not 
as to a societal group (who Roma people are, what characterizes them, what are “Roma” cultural traits 
and social conducts either through self-identification or external identification), but to the Hungarian 
society’s constructed image of “the Roma.” The constructed image has already been extensively 
studied empirically in Hungary (Csepeli et al 1998, Tárki 2006, Bernát 2010, Bernáth and Messing 
2011, Bernát et al 2012). Thus, it is not “the Roma” that the article is centered around, but “anti-Roma 
sentiment” that is present, identifiable, and describable in Hungarian society.
14 An outstanding scholarly debate took place in Hungary during the 1990s, following statistical 
surveys using different methodologies along different identification criteria for the Roma. For more 
on the methodological puzzle and elements of the debate, seeHavas and Kemény(1995), Kertesi(1996), 
Kemény(1997), Ladányi and Szelényi(1997), Havas et al. (1998), Kertesi(1998), Ladányi and 
Szelényi(1998a), Ladányi and Szelényi(1998b).
                                           Ratio of respondents agreeing with the sentiment
Positive items 1994 1997 2000 2002 2008 2011
More social benefits should be given 
to the gypsies than to non-gypsies. 15 10 15 12 8 11
All gypsy children have the right to attend 
the same class as non-gypsies. - - 88 89 86 82
Negative items      
The problems of gypsies would 
be solved if they finally started working. 89 - 85 88 78 82
The inclination to criminality is in the blood of gypsies. 64 - 55 53 60 60
It is right that there are still pubs, clubs 
and discos where gypsies are not let in. 46 47 38 33 36 42
N 988 3,857 1,521 1,022 4,040 3,040
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Research results show that during the past two decades, the positive attitudes of 
Hungarian society towards Roma have somewhat weakened, while negative attitudes 
have remained high. Regarding social benefits provided to Roma people (referring 
to the traditional name “gypsies” in the quoted research terminology), only 11% of 
respondents supported extra sums provided to them, while still more than four-fifths 
of respondents agreed that their problems would be solved “if they finally started 
working.” Furthermore, still 60% of respondents agreed in 2011 that “the inclination to 
criminality is in the blood of gypsies,” showing why “Roma criminality” can be used 
so effectively in discourse. Regarding attitudes to segregation, we can see a slightly 
pro-segregation trend in the past decade both in schools and in other public places.
If we also add the results of public opinion polls that have focused on public 
attitudes, we find similar results: people think of “the Roma” as having an 
inclination to criminality and an antagonistic attitude, and are characterized by 
unemployment, societal differentiation, and self-segregation (Csepeli et al. 1998: 
458–489, Székely et al. 2001: 19–46, Enyedi et al. 2004: pp. 383–386, Tárki 2006, 
Publicus Research 2009) (Table 3).
Table 3: Public sentiment expressed towards “the Roma” along certain dimensions of 
cooperation and conflict. (Publicus Research 2009)
This assumption is also supported by the empirical data that reflects attitudes 
towards Roma people by political party preferences (Table 4), highlighting that 
people encountering more negative attitudes are significantly more inclined 
towards Jobbik. As the Political Risk index of 2010 summarizes, 68% of Jobbik 
voters, 55% of Fidesz voters and 54% of MSZP voters openly declared anti-Roma 
sentiments during a 2009 study (Magyarország politikai kockázati indexe 2010: 
60). It is also important to note that according to these results, the majority of 
Hungarian people perceive the Roma population as a threat to societal security 
(38% fully agree, 25% rather agree – altogether 63%). Moreover, this is true across 
the spectrum of party preferences measured (Jobbik: 85%, Fidesz: 64%, MSZP: 
56% fully or rather agree). The situation is similar with respect to crime: almost 
half of the respondents think that “the inclination to criminality is in the blood of 
gypsies,” allowing an easy path to discourse on “Roma criminality” (47% of the 
total population; 66% of Jobbik, 48% of both Fidesz and MSZP voters).
                                                                                                                                                    Rather    Rather
Statement                                                                                                                               disagree      agree
There are certain criminal acts that are more often committed  
by Roma perpetrators, therefore respective legal measures 
should be applied for the Roma. 45% 46%
It is better if the Roma do not mix with non-Roma. 40% 50%
The Roma are not more inclined to commit violent crimes than the non-Roma. 52% 37%
The Roma are inherently unable to coexist with non-Roma. 38% 52%
The increasing number of Roma people within society is a threat to societal security. 27% 62%
The Roma should be given more support than non-Roma people. 74% 18%
A certain number of students of Roma origin should be admitted to institutions 
of higher education irrespective of whether they fulfilled application requirements. 75% 16%
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Table 4: Attitudes towards the Roma in 2009 according to party preference
(Magyarország politikai kockázati indexe 2010: 61)
In sum, the long-standing traditions of negative public perceptions of “Roma 
otherness” and negative attitudes towards “the Roma” in Hungary have prevailed 
and in certain aspects have become more confrontational in recent years. This 
has created an “enabling environment” as the Athena Institute describes it. This 
indicates a social environment in which people who have radical views or groups 
of such people subscribe to extremist ideas (Athena Institute 2013). This pattern 
coincided with the need perceived by a significant ratio of Hungarian population 
to deal with problems of societal and economic security, strongly connected in 
popular discourse to the Roma. When radical right-wing Jobbik appeared on 
the political scene in 2003, the new party adopted the topic as one of its flagship 
projects.15 (Political Capital 2008: 29, Krekó et al. 2011, Magyar Progresszív Intézet 
2012: 3). Shortly thereafter, and especially after 2006, Jobbik was able to dominate 
the way issues related to the Roma population of Hungary were thematized, as 
other political parties tried to avoid these issues, or (when they got involved), their 
activities brought only limited results.
DESECURITIZATION MEASURES UNDERTAKEN BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN 2009–
2010
Beyond a theoretical analysis of the securitization moves by radical and extreme 
right-wing actors in Hungary, the practical conclusions of how such an attempt 
can be redirected to normal politics – desecuritized – by the state should also 
15 Since the former major extreme right-wing political party, MIÉP (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja – 
the Hungarian Justice and Life Party) could not make it into the parliament in the 2002 elections, there 
was a window of opportunity for a new radical/extreme right-wing actor to appear on the political 
scene. By addressing previously neglected issues, such as societal and economic problems that were 
related to wide strata of Hungarian society, including some identified as Roma-related as well, Jobbik 
could fill a “missing role” and become the broker of anti-Roma sentiment, even channeling it to the 
Parliament after the 2010 national elections (Bíró Nagy et al. 2012: 3–4).
A growing Roma population 
in Hungary means a threat
to societal security. 5:fully agree 38 62 37 36
 4 25 23 27 20
 3 21 11 19 21
 2 8 3 7 11
 1: fully disagree 9 1 10 11
The inclination to criminality 
is in the blood of gypsies. 5: fully agree 26 37 27 27
 4 21 29 21 21
 3 29 24 29 25
 2 11 6 11 11
 1: fully disagree 13 4 12 17
                                                                                                              Total                   
                                                                                   population       Jobbik      FIDESZ     MSZP
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be drawn. Experience shows that despite the prevailing discourse on “Roma 
criminality,” in 2014 there have been fewer (threat) marches organized, while 
physical violence has declined and mainstream media discourse has been less 
concentrated on these issues. As the most capable and legitimate authority, the 
central government (the state) is entitled to act among such circumstances, but 
still there might be several alternative explanations why the desecuritization 
process was seemingly successful in 2010 and afterwards.
At least four such alternative explanations may be framed: 1) The problems 
highlighted in the discourse could have been solved; 2) Radical and extreme right-
wing actors could have given up on their securitization agenda; 3) The means 
that enabled radical and extreme right-wing actors to carry on with securitization 
have been removed or made inaccessible; or 4) Public attention could have been 
diverted, changing perceptions of these problems. 
Experience has shown that the first and second options have not been realized. 
Social problems have prevailed (HVG 2013a, Policy Solutions 2013, TÁRKI 
2013,VG 2013) and crime is still an issue (Origo 2012, HVG 2013b); moreover, 
radical and extreme right-wing discourse has kept its anti-Roma characteristics 
(Népszabadság 2013, Jobbik 2013). However, the third and fourth explanations – 
not being mutually exclusive – seem to have played a role in the desecuritization 
process, beginning as early as 2009. In both respects, the central government 
possessed the means to exert effective action.
Measures undertaken by a government (narrowly focusing on curbing and 
revising securitization itself, rather than broadly or comprehensively managing 
i.e. crime or unemployment) can range from normal legal action against 
undemocratic (i.e. paramilitary) organizations through altering public policies to 
the allocation of extra resources for ensuring public safety (i.e. through increasing 
police presence in settlements). The general feature of any measure is to ensure 
state control over the legitimate use of violence, to prevent the illegitimate use 
of violence, and to protect all citizens from physical violence irrespective of any 
social, cultural or other background.
Legal measures are designed to support the above-mentioned aims in order to 
execute these tasks in compliance with democratic standards and the rule of law, 
and to sanction non-conforming actors, whether they be individuals or organized 
associations. In the case at hand, such legal action included the dissolution of 
Magyar Gárda Hagyományőrző és Kulturális Egyesület and Magyar Gárda 
Mozgalom by the court on July 2, 2009. These measures targeted extremist 
paramilitary associations first, in an effort to limit their scope of action as soon as 
possible. A parallel investigation began focusing on extremists in order to uncover 
the serial killers (the so called “Gang of Four”) who attacked Roma families and 
property in 2008–2009, murdering six Roma people and injuring another seven 
with firearms.
Both the Bajnai (2009–2010) and Orbán governments (2010-present) could most 
appropriately address the atmosphere of fear and insecurity through increased 
police action. The goal was to maintain public order and safety by visible police 
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presence on the streets (with a strong emphasis on rural neighborhoods), efficient 
efforts to tackle crime (including petty crimes), and maintaining adequate 
criminal court cases that would bring results within reasonable timeframes (in 
order to strengthen the population’s trust in public institutions).
One such measure was the Public Order and Safety Program (Rend és 
Biztonság Program) initiated by the Bajnai government in 2009, then re-launched 
in March 2010 during the campaign for national elections (Jogi Fórum 2009).
This meant an enhanced police presence in the streets, complemented by the 
establishment or facilitation of civilian guards and neighborhood watch groups 
under the control of local public authorities in order to prevent the “privatization 
of violence” by avoiding the establishment of such “vigilance committees” like 
the Magyar Gárda, in which citizens tried to take the law into their own hands.
In order to divert public support from Jobbik, governing parties (MSZP during 
the run-up to the national elections, and Fidesz as part of its election platform, 
followed by its government program) also began to prioritize public order, safety 
and crime concerns. Both parties reacted to the societal discourse on social 
benefits in a way that tried to remove the ethnicizing undertone of Jobbik.
To some extent these measures were effective; beginning in 2010, public 
discourse mostly returned to normalized political standards and physical 
violence disappeared from the streets. Despite this general impression, the 
changing patterns of media and societal discourse in the 2010–2014 period need 
to be explored and investigated in detail, which is not the subject of the current 
study.
CONCLUSIONS
Along the chronological line drawn between 2006 and 2010, this article argued 
that a process of securitization took place targeting Roma in Hungary. In the 
period under review, the securitization attempt by radical nationalist party Jobbik 
Magyarországért Mozgalom and related extremist proxies, such as the Magyar 
Gárda, was escalated to a level where it was widely – though not unanimously 
and unquestionably – affirmed by the public, provoked direct political reactions, 
and elicited direct action on behalf of the central government. These reactions, 
however, were only efficient to the extent of preventing further escalation and open 
violence, without addressing the underlying problems that enabled securitization.
When a window of opportunity in the political arena appeared for a new radical 
right party after the 2002 national elections, Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom 
realized that putting sensitive and polarizing societal problems on its agenda 
might provide the basis for increasing its political capital. However, we cannot 
speak of simply adopting previously unaddressed issues such as public safety 
and crime to their agenda, but of going far beyond. They did this by constructing 
a political and media discourse that directly linked these problems to Roma 
through radical othering and blaming, providing the means of securitization. 
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This could thrive in an enabling environment, namely the dominantly negative 
attitudes and sentiments expressed towards a constructed societal image of “the 
Roma” throughout the majority of Hungarian society. Xenophobic attitudes and 
anti-Roma sentiments and prejudice have long been present in Hungarian social 
thought, and have not receded in the past twenty years. This very negative image 
of Roma could serve as the basis of successful securitization between 2006 and 2010. 
When economic and political crises triggered increased societal tension in Hungary 
from 2006 on, and people demanded strong responses and called for order, Jobbik 
was ready to offer its “radical solution.” In doing so, the party could effectively build 
on anti-establishment, anti-elite, anti-capitalist, and anti-Roma sentiments as well.
Driven by trigger events and supported by securitization moves, the 
securitization attempt escalated in 2009 and 2010 campaigns for European and 
national parliamentary elections, revealing a conscious political agenda behind 
the strategy.16 This also led to a response both among the broader Hungarian 
society and the political elite on a national level concerning a series of violent 
events in 2009 and 2010 (Olaszliszka, Tatárszentgyörgy, Veszprém, Sajóbábony, 
serial murder cases in Eastern Hungary targeting Roma families). The heightened 
tensions among Roma and non-Roma members of local communities brought 
about a series of threat marches, including cases of physical violence.
It is important to note that keeping the constructed “Roma issue” in the media 
and on the political agenda was a cause for Jobbik’s increase in power and not an 
effect. This is evidenced by the fact that the party appeared in the media from 
2006 on and was boosted up by 2009 – and was not brought to the forefront of 
discourse only after 2009–2010 – after all, Jobbik was already a capable actor in the 
political arena by this time. What Jobbik added to the problem of crime and public 
safety concerns was the discursive practice that tied Roma to crime and conflict, 
depicting Roma as “slackers”, “criminals”, and “dangerous antagonistic people,” 
thus constructing a “Roma issue” through radical othering. The practical means 
for sustaining media attention and catalyzing the securitization attempt were 
extremist organizations such as the Magyar Gárda that continuously provided 
occasions for appearing in national media because of the intimidation and threat 
marches, conducted in rural areas identified as Roma neighborhoods.
Intimidation peaked by the end of 2009 and this negative trend only eased to 
some extent in2010, when focused government action attempted to desecuritize 
the hotly debated issues of societal security. In doing so, the most successful 
measure of the government proved to be the removal of some of those means 
that enabled radical and extreme right-wing actors to carry on with securitization: 
16 In the 2009 European Parliament elections, Jobbik successfully competed for votes, gaining 
14.77%. In the following year’s national elections, the party won 12.18% of the vote, gaining 47 seats 
out of 386 in Parliament. Of course, Jobbik’s electoral success is not solely the consequence of framing 
anti-Roma discourse; one should study a wider set of “enablers,” including failures of government 
policies, the negative effects of economic recession, which caused a transformation of social 
redistribution systems, long term crime trends, etc. The dynamics of internal politics and national 
elections, however, cannot be included in detail in the current article. For more details, see Political 
Capital (2009), or Rudas (2010).
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restricting paramilitary organizations like the Magyar Gárda and diverting public 
discourse from envisaging conflict between Roma and non-Roma. However, it has 
been pointed out that in general, “government responses had been weak,” (FXB 
Center, 2014: 36) and “the Government had remained tolerant towards Jobbik’s 
intimidation practices.” (Dettke, 2014: 15) Thus, the basic elements of Jobbik’s 
communication (“Roma criminality”) and political agenda (“creating order”) have 
not vanished, and practices of intimidation have prevailed beyond 2010 as well. 
Following the logic of events between 2006 and 2010, the chance of a renascent 
securitization attempt was still present in the run-up to the 2014 national elections. 
The original contribution of this research is the operationalization of the 
constructivist securitization theory in the case study of Roma in Hungary. As this 
is a rather atypical securitization attempt – the state not being the securitizing actor 
– and as it encompasses a longer time period, the research framework is built on 
process tracing. Process tracing enables us to identify those means and patterns 
that bring securitization forward (securitization moves) as well as those events 
that escalate these processes (trigger events). The methodology proposed herein 
also incorporates and builds upon the criticism towards the speech act-centered 
approach to securitization and allows for a much more elaborated examination 
of the context. Demonstrated by the results of the research that is built on this 
methodology, this approach can be recommended for further examination of 
other case studies as well.
Summing up my research results, I came to the conclusion that the securitization 
attempts of radical right-wing actors were successful in 2009–2010, with Jobbik 
Magyarországért Mozgalom and associated extremist associations such as the 
Magyar Gárda being the securitizing actors. Jobbik developed its securitizing 
discourse through constructing a connection and correlation between Roma and 
poverty – poverty and crime – crime and Roma, thus introducing and spreading 
the term “Roma criminality” in political, media and societal discourse through 
effective radical othering. In this process, radicals could build on prevalent strong 
anti-Roma sentiments within Hungarian society, a definite call for more order and 
increased public safety, strengthening welfare chauvinism at the time of financial 
crisis and deep political and moral crisis in Hungary. As the underlying reasons 
for the success of securitization – at once financial, political, and social crises – 
have been difficult to overcome (if it was ever possible at all), the Bajnai and Orbán 
governments had limited opportunities to restrain the means of securitization. 
Therefore – keeping in mind certain limitations of my research regarding its 
timeframe – we cannot speak of successful desecuritization but only of limiting 
and diverting the securitization dynamics.
At the end of the day the question still remains open: was the government 
of Hungary successful in removing the “Roma issue” from the security agenda? 
The appearance or lack of radical- or extreme-right discourse and actions 
before the national elections in 2014 could possibly provide an answer to this 
if confrontational practices were to be brought back again (or not). Despite this, 
alternative explanations still remain to be studied in both cases.
52
4 Security! How Do You Study It? An Introduction into  
 Critical Methodologies and Research Methods1
Ľubomír Lupták and Václav Walach
It has been over fifteen years since Jef Huysmans (1998) posed the question essential 
for every student of security: “Security! What do you mean?” Several theoretical 
orientations have crystallized in response, confirming Huysmans’s observation 
that the “exploration of the meaning of security is the security studies agenda 
itself” (1998: 223). There were few analyses dividing critical security studies into 
schools of thought (Wæver 2004; Taureck 2006) as well as a synthesis attempting 
to “go beyond the artificial boundaries in order to combine a variety of critical 
approaches under a common framework without, nonetheless, reducing one 
approach to another” (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006: 451). And no matter how many 
new security issues are identified (Burgess 2010), the meaning of security remains 
contested, as distinctive and mutually exclusive logics of security are theorized.
In the critical literature, two main logics of security are confronted. The first one 
relates security to exclusion, violence, fear, and anti-democratic politics. Against 
this bleak vision, the concept of emancipation is erected to conceive security in 
terms of human freedoms and rights. As such, the conflict over the meaning of 
security has been related to a normative problem: is it possible to make security in 
a positive way, or is the point to distance oneself and resist its oppressive logic to 
achieve emancipation? (Browning and McDonald 2013; Nunes 2012; Van Munster 
2007). The adherents of the latter approach have suggested different politics out of 
security (Aradau 2008; Bigo 2010; Neocleous 2008; Peoples 2011). However, their 
opponents have countered with the argument that there is no intrinsic, timeless, 
and abstract logic of security; there are merely dominant representations and 
practices of security that can be and, in fact, should be dissected and challenged.
It is far from banal to assume that security indeed does different things at 
different times and in different places, as this has important implications for 
methodology (Ciuta 2009). Since research on security “comes from somewhere, is 
produced by someone, and has potentially significant impacts on others” (Jarvis 
2013: 236), the idea of neutrality or pure objectivity is untenable and the question 
of context and interpretation gains in importance. Hence, not only “theory is 
always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox 1981: 128), but also the ways 
through which we study (in)security empirically inevitably contain certain 
political decisions and dilemmas leading to highlighting some and obscuring 
other elements of the social reality. The reflexivity, as in all social sciences, is thus 
the crucial aspect of solid research process.
1 This text was supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic as part of the project No. 14-
10641P ‘Critical political sociology of (in)security: dramaturgical analysis of public events in the field 
of (in)security experts’.
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In this chapter, we will discuss the recent development of interest in methodology 
and research methods in critical security studies as a sort of conclusion to this 
book. The words “methodology” and “methods” have been treated as a source 
of confusion and anxiety especially on the side of students. Without textbooks 
or manuals on the use of formalized methods specifically in the field of security 
studies, students of security were often wrestling with hardships and doubts 
about the practical aspects of research and its relationship to the endless supply of 
theoretical frameworks and concepts. Dealing with the question of what it means 
to study security critically both in terms of theoretical approaches and discussions, 
and actual research practice, we aim to provide a basic introduction which might 
help to think about as well as to conduct an inquiry into the world of (in)security. 
To advance this intention, we focus on our long-term research projects, which 
happen to focus on two rather different fields: first, the practical world of security 
professionals; and second, the socially excluded locality – with both of the research 
projects embedded deeply in the context of post-socialist Central Europe (Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic). As these projects were conceived from the very beginning 
as critical enterprises, this trait is particularly scrutinized. 
First, we describe the recent shift of attention from theory to methodology 
in critical security studies. As there are no methodological questions which do 
not engage theory, a very short introduction to the contemporary theorization 
of security is included, as well as a discussion of the specific problems of ethics 
in security research. The second section focuses closely on the “methodological 
turn” in critical security studies. In particular, the topics of research design, the 
methodological genres titled “methodological turns” by Salter and Multu (2013), 
and the critical re-conceptualization of methods debunking their performative 
and political nature (Aradau and Huysmans 2013) will be presented. 
The paper concludes with two practical security research examples and their 
discussion. Once a security bureaucrat himself, Ľubomír Lupták introduces 
his (auto)ethnographic study of the people who do security (i.e. the security 
professionals operating in the bureaucratic, academic, media, and NGO spheres 
in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic), trying to grasp the cultural and political 
significance of everyday practices, interactions, communal rituals, and symbolic 
production of this strange tribe of experts. Václav Walach turns attention to 
the experience of people who are often talked about in the context of security 
– the Roma, who in the Czech Republic are often relegated to marginalized 
neighborhoods (see also the third chapter of this book), attempting to make sense 
of their everyday (in)securities through his ethnographic inquiry.
FROM CRITICAL THEORY TO CRITICAL METHODOLOGY
After the “return to theory” in security studies (Wæver and Buzan 2013), one may 
speak about entering the age of methodology. Ontological and epistemological 
issues were for a long time at the heart of critical debates, whereas the “ideas 
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that inform the methods and techniques that we use” (Shepherd 2013: 1) were 
rather put aside (Aradau – Huysmans 2013). That is not to say, of course, that 
the methodological question of “how we do what we do” (Salter 2013a: 1–2) had 
not been discussed before, nor that researchers did not think critically about 
their inquiries.2 We can nonetheless see recent years as a time of change in 
critical security studies, as a number of publications, research projects, seminars, 
workshops, courses, and public lectures have been devoted exclusively to 
methodology and research methods.
On the other hand, this explosion of methodology may also be viewed as an 
expression of rather problematic transformations occurring in the social sciences 
in the recent decades. Methodological fetishism, a bias toward quantitative 
research, and ritualistic proceduralism have been criticized by a whole range 
of authors as devastating to the actual ability of the social sciences of providing 
original insights into social processes and phenomena. 
More than half a century ago, Charles Wright Mills attacked the abstracted 
empiricism and bureaucratic ethos taking over the various departments and 
institutions of social science (Mills 1959: 50–119). Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc 
Wacquant have condemned the “methodologism” and “theoreticism” as two 
forms of “involution … separating reflection on methods from their actual use in 
scientific work,” leading to the cultivation of “method for its own sake” (Bourdieu 
– Wacquant 1992: 26–27). Most recently, Jock Young’s lament about criminology 
points out how “reality has been lost in a sea of statistical symbols and dubious 
analysis” (Young 2011: viii), where the focus seems to be more on innovation of 
statistical techniques and mathematical equations than on understanding and 
explanation of phenomena (ibid.: 47).3 Even in predominantly interpretative 
disciplines like anthropology, scholars have noticed the pressure of “scientific” 
research standards, often derived from the deductive logic of research, impeding 
their work (Okely 2012: 1–25). 
Looking back at the changes in academic writing in the last few decades, we 
can observe a significant increase in formalism and proceduralism, turning the 
ever-increasing and sophisticated methodology sections into spaces of academic 
intimidation rituals, the function of which is far from making one’s road to his or 
her results more transparent. Attempts to reclaim methodology (see e.g. Hansen 
2006: 16) and to delve into worlds of ritualistic ptydepe4 thus may seem unfortunate 
– submitting to the new “rules of the game” instead of accepting (and resisting) 
 
2 There are various remarkable contributions to the subject that we highly recommend reading, 
see, e.g., Ackerly et al. 2006; Alker 1996; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009; Hansen 2006; Jackson 2011; 
Klotz and Lynch 2007; Klotz and Prakash 2008; Krause 1998; Milliken 1999; Pouliot 2007; Sylvester 
1994; Vrasti 2008, etc.
3 For a critical defense of quantitative methods, see Sjoberg and Horowitz (2013).
4 In Václav Havel’s play “The Memorandum,” ptydepe is an artificial language boasting the ability 
to overcome the ambiguity of all other languages by adherence to strictly scientific principles – in 
the end, however, the language is an absurd and incomprehensible mess. Here the word is used as 
a metaphor of the various technical/bureaucratic jargon which often seem much better in obscuring 
meaninglessness than in conveying meanings.
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the fact that the “game is rigged” (Broadus 2006). The explosion of new forms 
of academic writing patterns concentrated around formalized methods and the 
increasing mathematization of the social sciences may well be interpreted as 
a result of the triumph of bureaucratic formalism over sociological imagination, 
with the academic craft and methodological procedures trumping research 
questions. Descriptions of methods used in our research might be helpful for the 
reader, but they should not serve to cover the fact that there is not much to say, 
and neither should they be used as tokens of “scientific-ness,” substituting for 
the actual results of one’s research. Defying this formalism with a return to the 
literary style of writing of classical authors of social theory (and for the simple 
fact that in order to write something we must have something to say) might be 
a better way of resistance of the bureaucratization of social science than devising 
and engaging in our own methodological newspeak.
In this paper, however, we depart from such a gloomy assessment of recent 
developments. Instead of “killing method” in favor of insight and creativity (Ferrell 
2009), we hold the view that the “tyranny of method” can be overturned. If we 
reframe methodology as an “overarching epistemological and meta-theoretical 
reflection,” it helps us to not only understand all the stakes implicit in an empirical 
investigation, but also to strengthen our inquiry this way (Aradau and Huysmans 
2013: 2). As it is not possible to meaningfully answer methodological (or any other 
kind of) questions without epistemology or theory, it is necessary to begin with 
a very short introduction to the theory of critical security studies.5
According to Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2010), there are 
several ways to characterize critical security studies. One of the first definitions 
conceived critical security studies more as an “orientation toward the discipline 
than a precise theoretical label” that would make the “question and problem of 
security” opened to change in terms of conceptualization and policy (Krause 
and Williams 1997: xii). The apparent broadness and permissibility mirrored the 
plurality of approaches influenced by multiple philosophies, ranging from critical 
theory and feminism to post-structuralism and post-colonialism. Since they 
sometimes found themselves in conflict, their opposition to traditional Realist/
Liberal security studies has functioned as the lowest denominator of them (see 
also Buzan and Hansen 2009).
To understand the nature of the critical challenge, we can recall a now classic 
distinction between problem-solving and critical theory. Critical security studies 
are meant to be critical precisely in the sense that they, unlike traditional security 
studies, do not “take institutions and social and power relations for granted but 
[call] them into question by concerning [themselves] with their origins [i.e., of these 
social relations] and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” 
(Cox 1981: 129). Later on, Fierke (2007: 27), among others, reaffirmed the “shift to 
an understanding of security as a social and political construction,” calling for 
a further politicization of security. It is the question what security does politically, 
5 For a more extensive summary of the theoretical development in security studies, see the first 
chapter of this volume.
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that is, how “representations and discourses of security encourage sets of practices, 
legitimize particular actors or indeed constitute political communities and their 
limits in particular ways” (Browning – McDonald 2013: 239), which is supposed 
to be answered.
Given this, João Nunes (2012) came up with a reading of security as the 
narrative of politicization in order to, first, organize the increasing production of 
critical security studies and, second, point to some of its limitations. In particular, 
he spoke about the demise of critique within the project, as scholars have largely 
resorted to the “negative” conception of security (see also Hynek and Chandler 
2013). Some scholars have concentrated on how security proclamations produce 
an exceptionalist curtailment of democratic procedures; others have highlighted 
routine practices that make certain social categories insecure as a result of the 
inner workings of the field of security professionals (e.g. Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; 
Buzan et al. 2005; Lupták 2011). Either way, security may be conceptualized as 
a mode of exercising power based on drawing a line between normality and 
deviance, or, more precisely, as a “principle of formation” which fosters violence 
and insecurity, establishing limits, divisions, and hierarchies between and within 
different social groups (Aradau and Van Munster 2010: 74). As security denotes, 
after all, “practices of survival” aimed at “postponing death by countering 
enemies” (Huysmans 1998: 234, 236), the most radical understanding of security 
in this sense identifies its final horizon with the extermination of dangerous 
deviants, for which Neocleous (2009) reserves the notion of the “fascist moment.”
The more security has been identified with the negative logic, the more the 
orientation of moving away from security and its potential emancipatory effects 
came to be seen as politically and ethically sound. The rise of the security state 
along with the repressive logic of surveillance after the events of 9/11 made this 
approach comprehensible (Agamben 2005; Aradau and Van Munster 2007; Bauman 
and Lyon 2013; Bigo et al. 2010; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Jabri 2006; Neal 2010). To 
Nunes (2012: 350), nevertheless, the “extraordinary progress in problematizing 
predominant security ideas and practices” was paid for by the “depoliticization 
of the meaning of security itself,” which has resulted in the diminished analytical 
capacity of critical security studies, the decreasing possibility of alternative 
notions of security, the inability to operate as a political resource, and in being 
constantly at risk of being politically counter-productive. If security indeed 
is a “framework for organizing contemporary social life” in a post-9/11 world 
(Goldstein 2010: 488), the price for not inventing more inclusive and democratic 
security practices might be too high (see also de Lint and Virta 2004).
Security as emancipation represents a positive outlook. For its advocates, 
“critique of security can be both deconstructive (denaturalizing and problematizing) 
and reconstructive (engaged in political struggles for transformation)” (Bosu and 
Nunes 2013: 75). The workings of security described previously can be transformed 
“not only by social struggles, but also by ideas that shape these struggles” in 
order to create “spaces in people’s lives in which they can make decisions and 
act beyond the basic necessities of survival” (Nunes 2012: 351, 357). To put it in 
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Marxian terms, all that is solid eventually melts into the air, and the seemingly 
unshakable security representations and practices are no exception (Linklater 
1996). This prospect is founded on the idea that security equates to “freeing 
people from the life-determining conditions of insecurity” (Booth 2007: 115). In 
other words, security and emancipation are “two sides of the same coin” which 
one uses to buy himself or herself out of the insecure circumstances limiting his 
free action (Booth 1991: 319). More security means therefore more freedom for 
everyone. Practices of survival might be carried out “not against others, but with 
them” (Booth 2007: 115).
Perhaps the best way to resolve this dispute might be to see “negative” and 
“positive” security as two poles of a continuum of security politics. Actually 
existing security representations and practices can be studied precisely in 
relation to the position which they occupy in the continuum. That is, if they are 
more pernicious to human freedom, they go closer to the “negative” pole and 
vice versa. This approach is fully compatible with Browning and McDonald’s 
suggestion to engage with the “nuanced, reflexive and context-specific analyses 
of the politics and ethics of security” (2013: 248) as a way to overcome the abstract 
security dichotomy through an understanding of how security is performed and 
experienced in reality. Empirically grounded inquiry that prefers the concrete 
over the abstract and the particular over the universal appears to us as a site of 
potential transformation, regardless if it is framed by the notion of security or 
not. Contextualized empirical research is never devoid of abstract theorization. 
Explicitly or implicitly, the way we grasp our object of research structures the 
research process itself, from our initial questions to our final interpretation and 
conclusions. As “there is... no such thing as description... that does not engage 
a theory” (Wacquant 2002: 1523–1524), researchers should reflect upon the 
theoretical assumptions that underpin their inquiry; otherwise, they will submit 
to lay interpretations and common-sense explanations. 
This is true of all research, but the importance of theoretical reflection especially 
arises in the case of fieldwork. Here, although we strongly encourage researchers 
to employ a “methodology of conducting fieldwork that allows individuals to 
speak in their own voice” (Croft 2008: 504), they should not do it “unarmed.” 
This means, to paraphrase Wacquant (2011: 87–88), that they should carry out their 
inquiry equipped with all available theoretical and methodological tools, with 
the full supply of problems inherited from their discipline, with their capacity for 
reflexivity and analysis, and guided by a constant effort to objectivize the experience 
acquired in research and construct the object, instead of allowing themselves to be 
naïvely embraced and constructed by it.
Theories have impact on research designs, for they structure the understanding 
of research object as well as research ethics. The titles of the two security logics 
might be perplexing; however emancipation lies at the heart of critical security 
studies overall (Wyn Jones 2005). As Jarvis (2013: 242–243) argued, the researcher 
as critic not only wants “to know the world better or differently, but also to 
challenge and critique existing sources, agents, and consequences of insecurity.” 
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Whether we intend to attain it through security or against security, there is always an 
idea of progress underneath.6 Even postmodern or post-structuralist approaches 
to security, deemed notorious for their reluctance to articulate any notion of 
progress whatsoever, share this preoccupation. For instance, Aradau and Van 
Munster (2010: 80) claim that the challenge to ongoing security practices is 
oriented towards emancipation as an “unconditional principle” which refers to 
a de jure universality – freedom and equality.
Burke (2013: 80, 87) also insists on preserving the “hope that [critical security 
studies] could constitute a form of scientific and ethical progress,” whilst 
recognizing “two major contributions to a postmodern ethics of security”: an 
“ethics of resistance and critique” and an “ethics of relation,” The first has been 
introduced on a basic level; it coincides with the critique of dominant security 
representations and practices that must be resisted and unmade. Nonetheless, 
since security practices are frequently tied up with and enable the “larger 
ontologies (the systems and signification of identity, otherness, and being),” it is 
identity itself – the self and its relations with others – that must be rethought to 
bring about a progressive change (see also Neumann 2010). The ethics of relation 
accentuates diversity and interdependence of human beings. It is based on the 
recognition of others through giving up the conception of “self-contained and 
self-referring ego, one that seeks mastery over its environment, nature, and other 
human beings” (Burke 2013: 87; see also Burke 2007). 
One of the routes to this end might be in Habermasian politics, in open 
dialogue, creating the symbolic and material possibilities of such a dialogue, and 
broadening the relationship between deliberation and its outcomes (Browning 
and McDonald 2013; Wyn Jones 1999). On the other hand, we should be wary 
of overlooking contextual specifics. When we research, for instance, how the 
field of security professionals contributes to the production and reproduction of 
social realities through (in)security discourses and practices, should we still talk 
about emancipation, or is emancipatory research of security reserved for research 
projects focusing on “experience of those men and women and communities for 
whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security” (Wyn 
Jones 1995: 309) after the fashion of immanent critique (Fierke 2007: 167–185)?
Obviously, these perspectives are seldom incompatible. Security 
representations and practices are part of the insecurity picture; they themselves 
produce insecurities which tend to target certain social categories more than 
others. Such an (in)security asymmetry might be the starting point in identifying 
emancipatory possibilities within the field of security professionals, out of 
which the current security representations and practices can be rendered more 
inclusive and democratic. At the same time, researching such representations and 
practices should be complemented by understanding what effects they have for 
6 Emancipation through security is obviously affiliated with Ken Booth (2007) and the “positive” 
strand of security thought. The approach against security is most eloquently articulated by Claudia 
Aradau (2008) and Mark Neocleous for whom Booth is “as mistaken as one can possibly be about 
security,” as, instead of security and emancipation, “security and oppression are the two sides of the 
same coin” (2008: 5, italics in the original). 
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those targeted by them. In Naderian terms (1972), both the studying up and down 
suit emancipatory purposes in security studies agenda. To identify how security 
politics operates in certain environments requires plunging into messy empirical 
worlds (Squire 2013). 
In the next section, we present five methodologies relating the methods of 
ethnography, field analysis, discourse analysis, corporeal analysis, and analysis 
of material culture to other components of research procedure such as the object 
of research, techniques of data construction, the nature of data, etc. (Salter and 
Mutlu 2013). Afterwards, we elaborate on the re-conceptualization of methods 
as performative and political instruments to demonstrate the possibilities and 
limitations that their application in an empirical inquiry creates.
THE METHODOLOGICAL TURN(S) OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES
With “more than twenty years of solid work in critical security studies” (Salter 
2013a: 11), the issues of methodology and research methods have risen to 
prominence. The questions of how we do our research and how such projects can 
inspire other researchers are of particular importance, because the production of 
theoretical knowledge can hardly be imagined without a “serious engagement 
with the empirical” (Salter 2013b: 15). An immersion into the empirical requires 
reflexivity in methodology as well as in theory. In more specific terms, it means 
“to include method as an explicit pillar of research that supports the argument as 
much as theory” (Salter 2013a: 13).
Openness toward the research object and reflexivity regarding the research 
process are crucial features of critical methodology. In this respect, Salter (2013a: 
2–3) speaks of “four postures of critical inquiry,” The first one considers social 
and political life to be complex and messy, making it impossible to identify 
any single unifying principle in social reality – context-specific understanding 
matters. Second, agency is presumed to be everywhere: in individuals, groups, 
states, ideational structures, and non-human agents too, and if we want to 
understand it, we need to deal with all of these subjects as well as the conditions 
they have produced and shaped them. The next posture bears on the nature of the 
relationship between these conditions and particular outcomes. Relying on the 
work of William E. Connolly, causality is supposed to be emergent. That is to say, 
there is no single or complex source to be set out by the analysis; there are only 
conditions of possibility allowing sets of politics, identities, or policies to occur. 
Discourses, institutions, structures, and agents render some paths possible, but 
not necessary; certain outcomes have been produced in certain ways, but their 
emergence out of these conditions is however never automatic or self-evident.
We already said that the issue of ethics is vital for critical security studies. 
Accordingly, the fourth critical posture corresponds with the recognition that 
research, writing, and public engagement are inherently political. Critical 
scholarship entails an active engagement with the world which has profound 
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implications for the role that a researcher plays in “both the activity of investigation 
and the narration of results” (Salter 2013b: 20–23). “Research never takes place in 
a vacuum” (Jarvis 2013: 236); it is situated in various social, political, institutional, 
and intellectual contexts, and this enables and constrains the choices available 
to researchers. Personal characteristics of the researcher always influence the 
research process, as his or her position in ethno-racial, class, gender, or spatial 
hierarchies usually differs from the position of those under study and makes it 
much harder to see the world through their eyes.
How can we handle a research project under these circumstances? Constant 
reflexivity is the first part of an interpretivist answer, clarity in research design 
and appropriateness of method for the object of study the second (Salter 2013b). 
As we in interpretivism are concerned with “legibility and not replicability” 
(ibid.: 15), a clearly specified research methodology is of utmost importance. 
Although not without reservations, the metaphor of “turn” has often been 
applied to methodological issues in critical security studies. We play on it here, 
too, as this style of explication is beneficial in presenting the research process as 
a coherent complex distinguished by its specific genre of analysis. On the other 
hand, the idea of genre should not lead to bounded, “inside-the-box” thinking 
that prioritizes methodological purity over the goal of inquiry. Researchers are 
encouraged to leave off formalized procedures and opt for bricolage whenever 
they feel it can benefit their aims. It is, first of all, the purpose of understanding 
the world of (in)security that should guide our conduct. Salter and Mutlu (2013) 
recognize five methodological approaches coined as the ethnographic, practice, 
discursive, corporeal, and material “turns”:
The ethnographic turn: The term “ethnography” is used to describe a 
range of qualitative data generation techniques that are naturalistic, meaning 
that they involve studying people or phenomena in their ‘natural’ setting or 
context, and produce accounts of research that are experience-near, meaning 
that they are based on people’s experiences of events, actions and phenomena 
in the setting or context (Wilkinson 2013: 129, italics in the original). 
To put it another way, an ethnographer strives for an “empathetic analysis of 
culture” (Salter 2013c: 51) that generates “thick description” (Geertz 1973: 5) based 
on participant observation, interviewing, and document analysis. As such, it is 
well-suited to the study of the self-understanding of human collectivities, their 
identities, norms, rules, and way of being, as well as the dynamics of encountering 
the other. Traditionally associated with anthropology, ethnography is not a total 
stranger to security studies, although its usage has been rather intuitive and non-
reflexive (Vrasti 2008). Ethnography’s significance nonetheless has increased, as 
the practical worlds of justice, power, and domination occupy a central place 
within the agenda of critical security studies. Especially, but not exclusively, 
“in cases where government statistics are suspect, media outlets are controlled 
by political interests, and poverty, lack of infrastructure, illiteracy, or political 
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violence impede survey research, ethnographic approaches are often the most 
reliable and practical means of collecting data” on how the meaning of security is 
constructed in a certain context (Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004: 269).
The practice turn: This approach is notably indebted to Bourdieu and his 
“thinking tools,” that is, field, capital, and habitus (Grenfell 2012; Růžička – Vašát 
2011).7 If ethnography search for meaning, field analysis lays stress on the logic 
of practice, the meaning of which must be unearthed in relation to the social and 
cultural context that makes its production possible (Bourdieu 1990). That is, when 
a researcher aspires to understand what people say and do, she must account for 
the internal functioning of fields in which they operate, applying the techniques 
of participant observation, interviewing, document analysis, and also statistics. 
Field is a relatively autonomous social space in which actors compete, struggle, 
cooperate, and interact for various types of capital (economic, cultural, social, 
symbolic) according to particular rules of the game (Salter 2013a). Viewed as 
an effect of a field, the practical materialization of habitus is seen in the form of 
mental schemata of perception, appreciation, and action that drive the operation 
of field (Salter 2013d). “To make visible the habitus and particular relations of 
struggle, competition, and dominance, analysts point to informal knowledge, 
social positions, and networks” of the agents engaged in the field (Salter 2013a: 3). 
The goal is to map the dominant objective structure of the field and the subjective 
understanding of the rules of the game, as they together produce certain effects.
The discursive turn: Basically, there is a bit of discourse analysis in every 
methodological approach. To be inspired by discourse analysis and to use it as 
a primary method are nevertheless two different things. As defined by Mutlu 
and Salter (2013: 113), discourse analysis is the “rigorous study of writing, speech, 
and other communicative events in order to understand these political, social, 
and cultural dynamics.” It is a “method to analyze these spoken, sign-based, 
or any other significant semiotic markers that provide meaning to the social 
world surrounding us” (ibid.). Discourse as such is a “linguistic practice that 
puts into play sets of rules and procedures for the formation of objects, speakers 
and themes” (Åhäll and Borg 2013: 197). A key aspect of this definition is the 
assumption that discourse does not merely describe objects or communicate 
certain meaning, discourse in fact does something. As it produces a more or less 
fixed representations of reality, discourse is constitutive of what we understand 
as “reality” (see also Neumann 2008). In security studies, the method has been 
applied, especially demonstrating the “impact of language on discourses and 
practices of security; not only highlighting the linguistic origins of insecurities but 
also demonstrating the impact of competing narratives in shaping them” (Mutlu 
and Salter 2013: 118; see also the second and third chapters of this book). There 
are a variety of ways to do discourse analysis. Bakhtin’s intertextuality, Foucault’s 
genealogy, and Derrida’s “anti-method” of deconstruction (Griffin 2013) are all 
7 The “practice turn” in sociology has surpassed Bourdieu’s œuvre and includes other social 
theorists such as Luc Boltanski, Laurent Thévenot, Michel de Certeau, Anthony Giddens, Stephen 
Turner, etc. (see Schatzki et al. 2001).
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among their cornerstone tools. Among the modes of discourse analysis, there is, 
however, a gap to be filled with the visual (Moore and Farrands 2013). Though 
the ethnographers routinely collect visual data, the visual representations of the 
worlds of security (both the world of experts, security practices, and narratives, as 
well as of the subjects of security) still remain rather unexplored, though it is hard 
to contest their pervasiveness or significance. The possibilities offered by visual 
fieldwork methods (cf. Pink et al. 2004: 11–99), iconography (Leeuwen 2008: 92–118, 
cf. also Collier 2008: 35–60) or interpretation through ethnographic film (Baena et 
al. 2004: 120–134) all seem to provide promising avenues for exploration.
The corporeal turn: Covering affect, emotions, and the somatic is an “emergent 
research agenda within critical security studies” (Mutlu 2013a: 139). This 
methodology comes from feminist approaches to critical security studies where 
the body is seen as a “political site” and a “site of resistance” (Salter 2013a: 7). It 
is characterized more by its research object than a distinctive method, and the 
specification of the object becomes even more vital for research design. There is a 
substantial difference among the attributes of the corporeal which manifests itself 
in the choice of fitting method. When we study affect (or the absence of it), we are 
interested in bodily reactions such as smiling, crying, increase or decrease of blood 
pressure, or head movement, and auto-ethnography, interviews, and participant 
observation seem to fit this aim best. On the other hand, when we are concerned 
with verbal or written expressions of those affective reactions, i.e., emotions 
like happiness, sadness, anger, pain, fear, lightheartedness, shame, etc., then we 
should go for discourse analysis. In both cases, a focus on corporeal practices is 
chiefly favorable, as bodies are increasingly subjected to security control exerted 
by state and private apparatuses. The somatic refers primarily to the subjugation 
of gendered bodies to the social. To understand how bodies are shaped by power 
relations and security practices in particular, we can apply discourse analysis, 
interviewing, participant observation, or archival research (Mutlu 2013a).
The material turn: Whereas security scholars have paid attention to the role of 
meaning, practice, discourse, and the corporeal, material objects were largely 
missing in the agenda. The material turn can be seen as a critique of all previous 
approaches, since they fail to make sense of how objects mediate human agency. 
It is this methodology, resting on the “radical reorganization of our social 
hierarchies, one that recognizes both human and non-human actants as agents 
of impacting our social world” (Mutlu 2013b: 179), that redresses it. Full body 
scanners, CCTV, biometric identification systems, databases, and non-lethal 
weapons are all objects that have become part of everyday governance. The 
essential idea behind this approach is that such “objects have a social base that 
expands beyond their material existence,” and, as such, they are central to the 
performance of our identities and practices (ibid.: 173). Ultimately, human agency 
is understood to be indistinguishable from its surroundings. To the followers 
of Actor Network Theory, agency is a network consisting of human and non-
human elements who act (see also Soreanu and Simionca 2013; Latour 2005). In 
this methodology, researchers use a “combination of discourse analysis, mapping 
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[social network analysis], and participant observations to trace the genealogy and 
quotidian uses of security objects” (Mutlu 2013b: 175) and examine an object’s 
effects on its surroundings.
These tools are relatively new to security studies and have their merits 
as well as limitations. To conform to standards of rigor, “frank discussion of 
research design limits, processes, and failures” is advisable (Salter 2013a: 9). In 
Guillaume’s words, “critical research design should open up inquiry, privileging 
the questioning rather than the answering, the doubt rather than the certainty 
that comes with an entrenchment in disciplinary practices” (2013: 31). In the rest 
of this section, we take seriously the claim that the “world is given through our 
methods of studying it” (ibid.: 3) and address the criticality of research methods.
By and large, methods are considered to be neutral techniques of gathering and 
processing data which guarantee the scientific natures of research. Because of the 
seeming separation of politics and methods, and the disciplining and constraining 
function of methodological requirements, methodological inquiry has been seen 
as “inherently suspect for a critical approach” (Aradau and Huysmans 2013: 5). 
Aradau and Huysmans (2013: 3) oppose this reading and propose to make method 
and methodological reflection a “key site of revisiting critique and politics.” At 
the heart of this endeavor is the re-conceptualization of methods as performative 
and political instruments. Far from being “no more than ways of acquiring data” 
(Della Porta and Keating 2008: 28), methods not only serve to analyze the world, 
but also to construct or deconstruct it in different ways. 
That is to say, methods are conceived as both performative and political; they 
present an “enactment of and rupture into the worlds of knowledge and politics” 
(Aradau and Huysmans 2013: 18). Methods, just like theories, are performative 
in that they “make and remake worlds, identities, and things in a fragile, 
continuously changing way” (ibid.: 9). All methods, be they surveys, data-mining 
techniques or in-depth interviews, drag along certain visions of social realities 
which are substantive in their effects. As devices, they inscribe themselves into 
the worlds they are supposed to study. Methods are also political rather than 
value neutral: “They are instruments not for creating common ground, but for 
power struggles, competing enactments of worlds and/or creating disruptive 
positions in the worlds of international politics” (ibid.: 3). To illustrate this by the 
authors’ own example, the “world of terrorism is different when accounted for by 
mapping global inequalities rather than by mapping terrorist networks” (ibid.: 
9). Conceptualizing methods as acts, Aradau and Huysmans draw attention to 
the fact that methods can also have disruptive effects, entailing ruptures in the 
representations of the world enacted by different methods. In this sense, the use 
of ethnography in a power-laden, exclusive, and secretive context not used to 
this kind of research practice, or any kind of research scrutiny for that matter, is 
in itself such a disruption, an act of sabotage consciously willing to strike both 
the world of academic (mainstream) security studies, as well as the world of the 
security bureaucrat.
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The twofold reconceptualization of methods answers a demand for critical 
orientation in security studies. Reclaiming methods themselves as areas that 
critical approaches can examine, the authors shed light on the high stakes of 
knowledge production. The ways we study the world have their specific political 
effects. Methods make certain worldviews as well as unmake them. Therefore, 
the basic methodological questions are how and what worlds we produce by 
means of research and, furthermore, what consequences result from this activity.
REFLECTIONS ON CRITICAL INQUIRY IN CENTRAL EUROPE
In this section, we analyze our research with respect to what has been said so 
far. The first body of research we would like to introduce may be considered 
traditional – to the extent that it is an exercise in critical political sociology as 
a discipline focusing on the relations between governance and social structure, 
with a special focus on the factors of bureaucracy, oligarchy, and ideology (cf. 
Bendix and Lipset 1966). Security is viewed simply as an overarching emic 
category motivating, legitimizing, and giving meaning to various forms of 
behavior of predominantly bureaucratic actors (i.e. actors occupying more or less 
significant positions in institutions of power or providing various services for 
these institutions). Security thus does not belong to the set of conceptual tools 
used in this research; on the contrary, these tools have been constructed with the 
exact aim to dissect and overcome the category of security as a major obstacle to 
understanding specific spheres and forms of practice connected with power and 
governance in contemporary societies. 
The less traditional aspect of this research (besides, perhaps, the above-
mentioned attempt to rob security of its relevance, gravity, and drama) lies in 
the specific position of the researcher as an insider in the practical struggles and 
discourse arenas marked by the category of security, a former security professional 
turned (auto)ethnographer, shifting from participant to participant observer/
observed. Obviously, the position of a rogue insider conditions the critical attitude 
toward the master categories structuring his or her former activities to a large 
extent, and the utilization of ethnographic and auto-ethnographic tools brings 
very specific tensions to the processes connected with entering and leaving the 
research field, as well as to the relations with former colleagues turned informants. 
This should make clear that the results of such research will not and probably 
cannot resonate very well with what security experts themselves would term 
security research.8
The primary research goal was simply to grasp and understand the researcher’s 
previous and rather strange and disconcerting experience as an actor in the field 
of security professionals in a small post-socialist country – research seemed to 
be a perfectly logical way to order, extend, and interpret it. There were a great 
8 For an illustrative emic (security professional) account of what is important for security research, 
see e.g. Ušiak and Lasicová (2007).
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many things to be explained: How come the actors in this segment of social space 
constantly engage in meaningless and futile routine activities,9 knowing they are 
meaningless and futile, but constantly performing with the gravitas connected 
with the vocation of a security expert “protecting” the society? How come huge 
amounts of bureaucratic/security texts, many of them classified, are created 
without any specialized training, in a manner that evokes high school papers 
rather than the peak of official expertise? How come most of the bureaucratic texts, 
regardless of their position in the official hierarchy of strategic documents, do not 
really have anything to do with the ways in which the huge amounts of resources 
are spent? How come the structure and language of the texts produced by security 
experts is so ritualistic and metaphysical, and at the same time so technically 
sounding, claiming unique access to specific knowledge of a “scientific” kind? 
How does one actually become a “security expert” and what is his or her function 
in the complex system of governance? Why have the numbers of security experts 
and their texts multiplied so much in recent decades? 
There seemed to be no way to provide a meaningful answer to these and 
countless other questions within the social world under scrutiny; emic concepts 
seemed too blunt and blind for grasping these problems. The research, therefore, 
had to be conducted with a set of theoretical tools alien to the research field, 
allowing the researcher to “exoticize the domestic, through a break with 
[the] initial relation of intimacy with modes of life and thought which remain 
opaque... because they are too familiar” (Bourdieu 1988: xi). At the same time, the 
practicality of the research questions as well as the nature of previous experience 
allowed for no other but a long-term direct empirical (ethnographic) investigation 
with as many complementary modes of data construction as possible, focusing on 
the world of everyday practices of security experts, as well as on their texts, and, 
last but not least, on a reflexive exploration of one of our own career trajectories 
as a security expert.
The core of our theoretical toolbox was constituted by the first critical security 
theory we10 encountered – the Copenhagen school’s theory of securitization (see 
especially Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 2005). Its limits in grasping and interpreting 
the everyday routine activities of the security experts, the language of security, 
and the goings-on of some segments of their world called for several pragmatically 
 
9 Such as writing a huge number of dossiers no one outside the closed world of a few security 
bureaucrats would (reluctantly) read, sometimes even engaging in prolonged and exhausting but 
largely pointless battles over words with other bureaucrats; formulating banal official positions with 
regard to this or that bureaucratic text that no one really cares about; preparing plans and strategies 
no one would follow (at times even pushing them through the government or Parliament, with no 
impact on their non-binding character); reading “top secret” documents consisting wholly of content 
copied from publicly accessible websites; engaging in endless rants against this or that “incompetent” 
or “useless” person or department (and knowing that the trope of “uselessness” may rightfully be 
used against you); or constantly complaining about lack of time (and being able to spend several hours 
of each workday doing so). The latter two examples are among the most pervasive routines serving 
important social functions in the worlds of petty bureaucratic politics, as well as providing a (modest) 
cover for the meaninglessness of one’s own activities. 
10 See Lupták (2011).
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oriented updates of the theory, which were thankfully provided by numerous 
crucial discussions and mutations of securitization theory within the field of 
critical security studies and international political sociology. 
The most important, however, was an update provided by Didier Bigo (2002, 
2008), connecting the critical analysis of discourses and practices connected with 
the label of security with Bourdieu’s rich theoretical apparatus. To be able to 
overcome the static and rather succinct character of the original securitization 
theory in the analysis of the linguistic and normative aspects of security, Lupták 
decided to draw from Holger Stritzel’s recent addition in the form of security 
as translation (Stritzel 2010, 2011). The final (at least at this time) addition to the 
conceptual toolbox was intertwined with the attempts to explore a particular 
part of the research field, that is, the communal celebrations of security experts 
(workshops, conferences, symposia, anniversary meetings etc.). Erving Goffman’s 
dramaturgical and frame analyses (see especially Goffman 1956, 1971, 1986; also 
Krčál 2013, Salter 2008) seemed to reconcile very well with the basic theoretical 
assumptions of other theories Lupták exploited, and provided a unique 
opportunity to delve deeper into the ceremonies and rituals of the strange tribe 
of security experts. Viewing these ceremonies as among the most important 
sites where the particular, localized regimes of security-truth are performed and 
negotiated (cf. Salter 2008: 322) allowed us to grasp better the relations between 
the banal, everyday practical world, textual practices, and the ceremonial behavior 
of the security expert.
As mentioned above, the core approach to data construction was ethnography 
as the most powerful tool for exploration of an insular face-to-face community (cf. 
Hejnal 2012), with a semi-covert11 approach to participant observation oscillating 
pragmatically between active and peripheral membership (Adler and Adler 1987: 
36–66). Access to the field was fairly easy – due to Lupták’s position as a former 
actor in the field and prolonged contact with former colleagues, some of them 
turned to core informants, while others helped in snowballing. The semi-covert 
research strategy employed to access the field was in hindsight very useful, and 
though it is connected with considerable ethical dilemmas, these are by no means 
unsolvable. On the other hand, if Lupták chose to walk the path of gaining formal 
validation of his access to the field, disclosing his research to the persons and 
bureaucratic hierarchies under scrutiny, he would most probably have closed the 
entryways guarded by the more jealous and secretive gatekeepers, and caused 
unwanted reactivity among the potential informants.
The main complementary techniques of participant observation included 
informal (field) and unstructured narrative interviewing driven mostly by the 
informants and focusing on their everyday problems, their career trajectories, 
ambitions, self-perceptions and perceptions of others, and other things they 
themselves considered relevant (cf. Gillham 2005: 37–53). Adopting the “collector 
and walking archive” role (Okely 1994: 20), and stumbling upon huge amounts 
11 A more detailed explanation of the motives and rationales of this approach may be found in 
Hejnal and Lupták (2013a).
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of security texts, Lupták also had to find a set of techniques allowing both 
the organizing of this data and the ability to delve deeper into the discursive 
techniques of security, grasping the structures of relevance and the basic 
assumptions governing the texts as well as the various modes of meaning 
construction and meaning exclusion utilized by security experts. To deal with 
the overwhelming number of texts, Lupták decided to use tools of computer-
assisted qualitative and quantitative data analysis (see Hejnal and Lupták 2013b), 
combining structural (inductive) and formal (theory-driven) content analysis. The 
CAQDAS tool used (MAXQDA 10, later MAXQDAPlus 11) also served very well 
as a digital hub, storing all of the data constructed in the field (field notes, text 
materials, and interviews, as well as visual and audiovisual data) and allowed the 
consistent coding of a wide array of data types.
The preliminary conclusions of this research (for more details, see Lupták 2011 
or 2012) revealed a specific kind of symbiosis between various types of actors 
participating in security practices and discourses in a post-socialist context, and 
pointed to the fact that it may be useful to view the local post-socialist world 
of security in three basic positions. First, as a pool of symbols and rhetorical 
and practical strategies used by political actors to localize the (neoliberal) 
transformation of governance: a specific segment of culture. Second, as a world of 
practice, with the overproduction of security texts and expansion of security-related 
techniques as a multilayered survival strategy utilized by bureaucratic, academic, 
police, military, and other cadres in the context of the global expansion of security 
discourses on the one hand, and post-socialist (neoliberal) transformation on the 
other. Third, as a source of economic and symbolic profit for actors attempting 
to capitalize on the cultural functions of security discourses, either by funneling 
large parts of security-related public budgets to private hands through selling 
goods and services to state and private institutions, or by utilizing the symbolic 
force inherent in securitizing discourses for mobilization of political support or 
for re-channeling of public attention toward an external enemy, turning it away 
from the local political elite. From the point of view of critical social research, of 
course, the third position seems to be most important; however, it cannot really be 
explored any deeper without tackling the first two.
The second of our research projects also started with personal discontent. 
The initial dissatisfaction with the grotesque securitization of Roma minority 
practiced by security experts, the prevailing tendency in the Czech Republic 
to see the areas with a higher concentration of marginalized Roma foremost as 
a “security risk for the majority” (GAC 2008: 25), and numerous violent rallies 
against “Roma criminality” (see also Tamás Csiki's chapter in this volume) was 
eventually transformed into a longstanding academic interest out of which an 
ethnographic research in a marginalized neighborhood originated. The inquiry 
aimed to make sense of how its inhabitants perceive the condition of security 
within the place where they live. Rejecting the a priori allocation of the roles of 
the menacing and the menaced, the research pursued a critical orientation, as 
it was anchored in the “corporeal, material existence and experiences of [those] 
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human beings” (Wyn Jones 1999: 115) who were predominantly seen as the source 
of danger rather than the subject of security.
Embedded clearly in the context of security-as-emancipation approach, 
security was conceptualized as an equivalent of human freedoms and rights 
that contributes to a specific meaning in a certain environment. To have a better 
grasp of the process surrounding the construction of the meaning of security, 
the research object was further specified. As a standard dictionary definition 
of security is the “absence of threats” (Booth 1991: 319), the notion of security 
itself can be understood as a set of three definitional components: the threat, the 
threatened, and the desire to escape harmful possibilities. Each of those “core 
elements of security” (Booth 2007: 100) was used to formulate specific research 
questions to (re)construct the meaning of security from the point of view of those 
who are imminently involved: What threats do the marginalized identify? What 
identities are expressed in this sense? What strategies do they adopt to prevent 
undesirable consequences?
The ethnographic standard – participant observation, interviewing, and 
document analysis – seemed from the very beginning as the most suitable tools 
to address these questions. However, when the author was designing the project, 
ethnographic methodology appeared to him as insufficiently elaborated in 
the discipline. To enhance competence in this genre, cultural criminology was 
highly instrumental. As it itself draws on a rich tradition of “getting-the-seat-
of-your-pants-dirty” inquiry (cf. Robert E. Park quoted in McKinney 1966: 71), 
it was chiefly helpful in thinking about methodological questions. Security was 
thus read in the research as a “creative construct” (Hayward and Young 2004: 
259), a result of “expressive human activity” (Ferrell et al. 2008: 2) that constitutes 
the “webs of significance” in which all people are suspended (Geertz 1973: 5). 
The symbolic reality of (in)security is intended to be enacted temporarily and 
through participation of a variety of actors. Not only the marginalized, but also 
social agents, politicians, journalists, the public, researchers, and others produce 
different interpretations in the circumstances of unequal power relations which 
make some of them dominant and others subordinate.
Owing to the researcher’s previous experiences with grounded theory method, 
data gathering and analysis were informed by some of its procedures. In particular, 
the idea of theoretical sampling that denotes a technique to create data through 
a constant comparison of observed processes of human action provided basic 
guidance in achieving the stated goal of inquiry. Avowing the broad-ranging 
critique of grounded theory (see e.g. Thomas and James 2006), the method was thus 
employed as a “flexible and versatile data analysis technique” (Timmermans and 
Tavory 2007: 495) rather than as a systematic methodological approach as conceived 
by its founders (Glaser and Strauss 1967). The main part of analysis took advantage 
of ATLAS.ti software which not only facilitated the process but also ensured better 
orientation in data (for more detailed account of analysis see Walach 2013a).
Unlike Lupták, Walach needed to determine a field for the study more 
specifically. In 2006, a map with more than 300 “Romani socially excluded 
7069
localities” in the Czech Republic was published (GAC 2006). Firstly, Walach 
considered a locality in the city where his university is located in order to reduce 
travel expenditures and to keep himself more in touch with research participants. 
This place, however, seemed too overcrowded by researchers, so Walach eventually 
decided on a locale in his hometown. Not only had it been largely neglected by 
academic researchers, but it was moreover publicly recognized as problematic in 
terms of security, as street crime as well as hate crime had been registered here. 
Finally, it was also possible to capitalize on his personal connections, including 
a Roma activist who promised to arrange the contact with marginalized residents. 
Entering the field was therefore significantly easier. The reason of his presence 
was no secret. Of course, not everyone Walach met during participant observation 
knew about it, but generally he did not conceal the research identity, since he 
considered it to be the best way to ensure the ethical side of inquiry.
Doing research on security among the marginalized is stacked with ethical 
challenges (Jacoby 2006; Stern 2006). To mention one, in Walach’s inquiry there 
were many situations when he was captured in a swirl of responsibility towards 
conscience and the well-being of people under study, ranging from registering 
the small everyday cases of law-breaking to asking the big questions concerning 
appropriate ways of presenting the research arguments. Most importantly, Walach 
was confused by the narratives of many research participants, as they were almost 
indistinguishable from the dominant discourse on the “Gypsy menace” (Stewart 
2012). His own experiences from the field, however, did not support the dismal 
picture portrayed by respondents. He does not argue that there were no cases of 
the frequently-mentioned social ills such as aggression, robbery, or theft. What 
he doubts was their quantity and intensity, which supposedly made the locality 
different from other parts of town. The uneasiness related to the risk of making 
the condition of the marginalized even worse ultimately prompted him to rethink 
the research project in a way of “stepping back” from the ethnography in favor of 
discourse analysis accounting more extensively for the symbolic construction of 
marginalized Roma neighborhoods as dangerous places (Walach 2013e).
Instead of outlining some conclusions of this still-ongoing inquiry (for this see 
Walach and Císař 2013; Walach 2013b, 2013c, 2013d), Walach ends this presentation 
with emphasizing and favoring the messy, shaky, and ambiguous character of 
research process in line with “wondering as a research attitude” (Lobo-Guerrero 
2013). As wandering back and forth, from side to side, and all the way around 
happens to be much more fitting to the actual conduction of inquiry, the linearity of 
research should be approached critically. To speak metaphorically, Walach started 
to ask people in their living rooms about what they fear in the neighborhood, went 
ahead through gambling at slot machines in dilapidated casinos, traveling cross-
country to Roma parties, providing local rappers with inspiration for their lyrics 
and finished with visiting the city council meetings and anti-racist rallies, but 
never ceased to ask himself how all of it relates to the given research goal and if 
the goal itself is formulated correctly after all. Walach asserts this sort of research 
“disorganization” is a good way to allow for the “singularities of a practice or 
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a discourse to stand out and for the researcher to make them explicit” (ibid.: 25). 
It was frequently due to surprises, those “unexpected disruptions in the order of 
knowing about phenomena” (ibid.: 27), that certain wider rationalities of thought 
were discovered and gave rise to fertile courses of inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Critical research on security is an idea whose time has come. If critical security 
studies are about to succeed (in Central Europe as well as elsewhere), its exponents 
must definitely devote themselves to political issues beyond the boundaries of 
theoretical problem-solving (cf. Booth 2013). At the heart of the project, there 
is a “commitment to researching the lived experience of those affected by (in)
securities” (Croft 2008: 506). There is the maxim to study security in ways that 
“seek to help to lift the strains of life-determining insecurity from the bodies 
and minds of people in real villages and cities, regions and states” (Booth 2005: 
276), whether it is done by focusing on those who produce (in)security, be they 
disgruntled security bureaucrats or beat cops, or those who are on its receiving 
end. To deal effectively with (in)securities of “real people in real places” (Wyn 
Jones 1996: 214) requires the realization of Wyn Jones’s thesis according to which 
“only political practice can bring about the development of a peaceful, secure, and 
just world order” (1995: 315). Conducting critical inquiry comes under this rubric; 
as “barbarism is still a strong possibility” (ibid.: 314), it aims not only to interpret 
the world in various ways, but also to change it.
In this chapter, we attempted to elucidate what is encompassed in researching 
security in a critical manner. Since there is no methodology without theoretical 
and epistemological reflection, we started with a short introduction to the current 
state of affairs of theorizing security. Borrowing the language of security logics, we 
endorsed the overcoming of the abstract dichotomy of “negative” and “positive” 
security conceptualizations in favor of an understanding of what security does and 
what ethical stakes are implied in specific contexts. Such a re-orientation of critical 
security studies undoubtedly puts the issues of methodology and research methods 
to the forefront. Openness and reflexivity are typical features of critical inquiry, 
whether it is conducted through ethnography, field analysis, discourse analysis, 
corporeal analysis, or the analysis of material culture. All of these methodological 
genres utilize manifold techniques of data processing, ranging from participant 
observation and interviewing to statistical methods. To recognize that different 
methods enact and disrupt certain representations of the world is part of a critical 
reading of methodology as an overarching epistemological and meta-theoretical 
reflection.
This was followed by the presentation of two research projects conducted in 
post-socialist Central Europe which, due to its specifics of capitalist triumphalism, 
expanding securitization discourses and security practices, the spread of anti-
Roma discourses, and rising social inequalities, appears to be truly well-suited 
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for critical and engaged research. By analyzing the everyday representations and 
practices of security professionals, Lupták challenged the political gravity and 
analytic value of security as a concept and instead focused on how it was used 
in the transformation and performance of governance in contemporary societies. 
With help of its native set of categories (threat, enemy, risk etc.), the discourse of 
security served to divert or channel public attention, depoliticize and technicize 
certain measures, stage symbolic performances of power relations, and ultimately 
served as a vital cog in the machinery of stratifying and classifying its members. 
His inquiry can therefore be classified as conforming to the “negative” logic 
of security. On the contrary, the “positive” motivation of Walach’s inquiry was 
embodied in the will to give voice to those who were securitized as the originators 
of insecurity rather than the recipients of insecurity. The authors applied a variety 
of different theoretical tools to make sense of their research objects, from (in)
securitization theory to cultural criminology. While both of them used the 
techniques of direct observation and interviewing, their inquiries, however, differ 
in methodological genres. With his interest in the internal logic of operation of 
security professionals’ field, Lupták is closer to Bourdieusian field analysis. The 
way through which Walach examined how the inhabitants of a socially-excluded 
locality constructed the meaning of security in their surroundings corresponds 
to more traditional ethnography, though it was further enriched by the analytics 
of grounded theory method. The issues such as the construction of field, ethical 
challenges, and more practical problems were also discussed.
The other two studies in this book have employed more distant methods 
of studying security, such as discourse analysis, and could be thus described 
as belonging to the previously introduced discursive turn. Both of them were 
also somewhat closer to the “negative” approach to security conceptualization. 
However, similarly as Lupták’s and Walach’s research projects, both Potjomkina’s 
and Csiki’s studies investigated the construction of security and security threats 
in specific Central European contexts. Showing that traditionally perceived 
external security issues have important domestic underpinnings, Potjomkina’s 
contribution investigated how the meanings of security, identity, and sovereignty 
are contested and negotiated within distinct national discourses that create 
differing interpretations of relations with a “key” foreign ally. This issue is very 
much shared by other states positioned between Russia and Western Europe as 
well. Focusing on another pressing topic for many of the Central European states 
– relations between the majority and minorities – Csiki’s chapter looked on the 
traditionally national (“internal”) topic and analyzed the intentional process of 
the construction of a security threat by extreme-right movements. Even though 
both these studies used different concepts, theories, and levels of analysis, both of 
them (again, similar to Lupták and Walach) pointed to close connections between 
security, politics, and identity in their analyses, and the problematization of these 
three concepts lies at the heart of the taks of critical security research. 
As a newcomer to Central European academia, critical security studies 
represent a very promising orientation. They can provide researchers with a strong 
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rationale as well as a colorful theoretico-methodological framework for the study 
of contemporary politics. Security is a “powerful political word” (Booth 2007: 108), 
and the political significance of many issues endowed with “security” firmly calls 
for a serious engagement. The hitherto taken-for-granted assumptions must be 
put under scrutiny, the representations and practices of security problematized, 
and an emancipatory perspective stressed in order to understand the condition 
of those who speak and do – as well as experience – (in)security. In light of the 
fact that most of the conceptual development in security studies occurs in North 
America and Western Europe, scholars should take the advantage of the specific 
political and social situation of post-socialist countries, as this unique context 
might be the fertile ground out of which new perspectives on security theory and 
practice will blossom (Drulák 2009). 
To conclude, let us thus again highlight the importance of context-specific 
knowledge, which was demonstrated by all the studies presented in this book. 
Whether it is the construction of security threats by militant extreme right-wing 
parties, or by (in)security professionals, it is precisely the understanding of 
security in time and space that allows us to acquire the relevant insights into 
what security means, how it works, and how it might be potentially changed. 
The students of security have nothing to lose but their theoretical chains and 
“common sense” prejudices. They have a world to win. 
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